The draft should also include new norms; among others the following:
“States should not conduct ICT operations intended to disrupt the technical infrastructure essential to
political processes, such as elections, referenda or plebiscites.”
India
(On PARA 39): Proposal for new norm related to need for an agreed standard of essential security in cyberspace
on the most effective ways to optimize the promising technologies while safeguarding the public. To this end, the
states shall strongly endorse the widespread adoption and verified implementation of basic cyber hygiene.
Protection of critical information infrastructure is the responsible behavior of the States. Threat to CII can spoil
integrity of information and damage economy and economic development of the nation. States must consider
protection of CII with public-private partnership. States should not conduct the ICT operations to disrupt CII.
States should not create harmful functions in ICT products. States should be responsible to notify users when
significant vulnerabilities are identified and notify to vendors to patch up the vulnerabilities. States should work
collaboratively of CII, exchange of information on threats and sharing of mitigation tools and techniques.
Islamic Republic of Iran
The roles of States, with the primary responsibility for maintaining a secure, safe and trustable ICT environment,
should be enhanced in ICT environment governance, including policy and decision making, at global level. The
envisaged governance should be realized in a manner which strengthen state sovereignty and shall not affect rights
of the states in making their choice of development, governance and legislation models in the ICT environment.
States should refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state within and through ICT environment.
No state has the right to intervene through cyber-related ways and means, directly or indirectly and for any reason,
in the internal or external affairs of other states. All forms of intervention and interference or attempted threat
against political, economic, social and cultural systems as well as cyber-related critical infrastructure of the States
shall be condemned and prevented. (UNGA resolution 2131 of 21 December 1965)
States shall not use ICT advances as tools for economic, political or any other type of coercive measures, including
limiting and blocking measures against target states. (UNGA resolution 2131 of 21 December 1965)
States should ensure appropriate measures with a view to making private sector with extra- territorial impacts,
including platforms, accountable for their behaviour in the ITC environment. States must exercise due control
over ICT companies and platforms under their Page 8 of 11 jurisdiction, otherwise they are responsible for
knowingly violating national sovereignty, security and public order of other states.
States should refrain from, and prevent, abusing ICT supply chains developed under their control and jurisdiction,
to create or assist development of vulnerability in products, services and maintenance compromising sovereignty
and data protection of the target states.
Japan
Japan’s new proposal to the OEWG is to add the following language as guidance to norm (i) on ensuring the
integrity of supply chain:
“States have the right and responsibility to ensure the use of trusted suppliers and vendors for ICT equipment and
systems, particularly to address national security concerns and protection of privacy. Reasonable steps may include
legislation or administrative measures to secure supply chain security, to support development of reliable and
industry,
to
diversify
suppliers.”
trustworthy
technology
and
Netherlands
“State and non-state actors should neither conduct nor knowingly allow activity that intentionally and substantially
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