two-way exchange of information and coordination between NSM and various CERTs. The Government is particularly keen to achieve good public-private cooperation in the field, and relevant parties from the public and private sector will therefore be involved in the work. The work will also examine how information and cooperation may be improved beyond the businesses currently included in the national framework for cyber incident management. NSM has also implemented several measures related to information sharing. NSM gathers CERTs sector-by-sector each month for a review of cyber incidents, as well as discussion of development needs and policy clarifications for the cooperation. A weekly video conference is also held with the CERTs in the various sectors. One of the goals is to unite all these CERTs in a joint reporting format. NSM has produced an unclassified national situation report, available via a portal with a login option for CERTs in the various sectors and national decision-makers. The purpose is to be able to share information quickly and securely. The portal was tested during the "IKT16" exercise, and the experience showed that the portal was an important source of information. In the spring of 2017, the portal was operational on an unclassified platform, and NSM is considering the possibilities to develop a similar portal on classified communication platforms. In 2017, NSM will also develop solutions for automatic sharing of warnings and technical information with CERTs in the different sectors. NSM exchanges weekly reports with the Nordic countries’ CERT functions. 7.4 Digital border defence The challenges of detecting cyber attacks also affect the issue of digital border defence in Norway. In 2016, the Ministry of Defence set up a committee (Lysne II) to investigate the principal aspects of granting the Intelligence Service access to digital communication in and out of Norway. The report points out the trends in society that highlight the need for new intelligence methods that monitor cross-border data transfer. Almost all the traffic has moved from radio and satellite to digital signals in cables. The Intelligence Service currently has no systems to control cross-border digital communication, and it has little or no access to the information in the communication cables. The Committee presented its report on 26th August 2016 and recommended introduction of a digital border defence with a clear framework and very strict control mechanisms to protection of privacy. A number of parties have been involved in the public debate, and conflicting views have been aired in a comprehensive consultation round. The Government believes that there is a need to strengthen Norway's capability to protect itself against external threats in and through use of cyberspace, and that there is a need to establish some kind of digital border defence. Therefore, the Government will consider and clarify how a digital border defence can be established and regulated. In such an investigation, it will be crucial to find a balance between the security and intelligence impact a digital border defence may have, and the privacy related issues such access raises. The Government is aiming for a consultation paper with draft legislation to be sent for comments in 2018.