44 a. Rapid deployment of the assault divisions for maneuvering. b. Logistics supply. c. Mobility between arenas. 33. The ability to affect and shape enemy cognitive perception is required in all conflicts, by means of systematic steps. Focused direction for the development of cognitive warfare capabilities are as follows: a. Developing systematic concepts to affect enemy situational awareness during all operational situations (REW). b. The ability to plan and synchronize the cognitive effort with other governmental ministries (the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, and others). 34. The ability to effectively manage PR and legal efforts during routine and combat aftermath, to allow the IDF to achieve its goals, including promoting legitimacy for its actions. This force buildup needs to consider media power to incorporate fast-moving mechanisms, planning and synchronizing among battlefield operations, PR, and the legal efforts. Buildup capabilities shall be focused on the following actions: a. Operational planning, supported by legal knowledge. b. Buttress inter-ministerial cooperation mechanisms (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice and others) to shorten decision-making and response times. c. Cooperating with countries having similar interests. Risk Management Relating to Scenarios - Not the Focus of this Document 35. Despite the fact that this document focuses on sub-state enemies, the IDF must relate to the capabilities required against extreme scenarios, not addressed herein, to manage risks, which, on the one hand, will focus on force buildup on the reference scenario, while, on the other hand, will not expose the State of Israel to unreasonable risks to its existence.