Within its borders the Netherlands attaches importance to a culture and ecosystem in which public and private parties jointly pursue a secure digital domain. Key elements of this outlook are the ability to provide an adequate response and a timely recovery of the system’s integrity, availability and confidentiality. In the international arena the Netherlands pursues robust and credible capabilities, on its own and in collaboration with allies, based on the principle of early detection, active defence and – if necessary – intervention. To protect its domestic and international security interests, the Netherlands also plays a leading role in bolstering NATO’s strong collective defence in cyberspace. At the 2016 Warsaw summit, NATO recognised cyberspace as a separate domain, so that cyber aspects could henceforth be factored into the entire operational process. Not only is a secure operational process important; it should also be remembered that the alliance’s cyber defence is only as strong as its weakest link. By taking the Cyber Defence Pledge, all allies have made a political statement committing themselves to further enhancing the domestic cyber defence of national networks and infrastructure. 4.5.2 International justice, standards of conduct and confidence-building measures Over the medium term the government will seek to establish an international normative framework for the regulation of cyber operations between states. The framework will largely take its cue from existing international law. Clarifying the applicability of international law to cyber operations is the Netherlands’ most important priority in this area. As a small country the Netherlands benefits from a well-functioning international legal order that provides a measure of predictability, stability and conflict prevention. By means of the Hague Process and on the basis of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, the Netherlands supports a more inclusive and detailed debate on the application of international law to cyber operations. The government is also pushing for international agreements on non-binding, voluntary standards of conduct for states and for confidence-building measures. In this way the Netherlands contributes to the development of an international security architecture for cyberspace, which will make the security dilemma more manageable. This security architecture will lead to increased stability and reduces the risk of escalation, miscommunication and miscalculation. To this end the Netherlands will launch a Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, a multi-stakeholder platform which will facilitate a global discussion on new voluntary standards of conduct in cyberspace. 4.5.3 Transparency regarding offensive military cyber capabilities The government is transparent about the Netherlands’ aim to develop military cyber capabilities. Internationally, the Netherlands is also pushing for greater transparency on the part of other countries in this area – not in terms of the nature of the capabilities, but rather with regard to the goals the capabilities are meant to achieve, the legal framework that governs their use, and the political control and democratic oversight that applies to their deployment. Transparency on this front serves as a confidence-building measure that can help prevent misunderstandings and reduce distrust. This, in turn, can help promote international stability, prevent the start of an arms race and eliminate distrust and the danger of escalation and miscalculation. 4.5.4 Export controls and the EU Dual-Use Regulation In order to safeguard international security and human rights, the government will push for either a ban on or a mandatory export licence for specific hardware, software and technology. These items are set down in the lists of controlled goods agreed within the Wassenaar Arrangement. These lists are fully incorporated into the relevant piece of European legislation, the Dual-Use Regulation, which deals with monitoring trade in goods that have both civilian and military applications. An example of this is ‘intrusion software', which can be used by authoritarian regimes to restrict civil rights. The government is in favour of expanding existing controls on devices for smart surveillance for reasons relating to human rights. On the other hand the government is highly critical of the AVT17/BZ122203 13