National strategy for the protection of Switzerland against cyber risks 2018-2022 19) Investigation Support Network for Digital Law Enforcement (ISNDLE) The federal government (fedpol) and the cantons (CCJPD) prepare an administrative agreement on cooperation and coordination between the National Cyber Competence Center (NC3) and the Regional Cyber Competence Centers (RC3) within the ISNDLE. 20) Training on combating cybercrime In cooperation between the Conference of Cantonal Police Commanders (CCPCS) and the Conference of Swiss Prosecutors (CSP), specific training concepts for a sustainable development of the necessary competencies in prosecution are being created. 21) Central Office for Cyber Crime Fedpol initiates the revision of the Central Offices Act (COA) in order to create a Central Office for Cyber Crime and the necessary basis for cooperation with the cantons to combat cybercrime. 4.8 Cyber defence Description Large-scale or highly targeted cyber attacks on critical infrastructures in Switzerland can endanger the security of the population and the economy. In addition to a broad range of measures to strengthen protection against cyber risks, capabilities and resources are therefore needed across all situations in order to prevent ongoing attacks and identify the actors responsible for them. In the case of attacks that endanger the functioning of critical infrastructures, active countermeasures must be taken where necessary to ensure their continued operation. Cyber defence encompasses those measures which serve in general to protect critical systems and to defend against attacks in cyberspace across all situations, i.e. including times of conflict and war. Background Overview of sphere of action With the Intelligence Service Act (IntSA) and the revised Armed Forces Act (ArmA), the federal government has the necessary legal basis to expand and take active measures and countermeasures as part of cyber defence. However, the development of cyber attacks over the past years and their growing complexity increasingly ties up resources over longer periods of time. This leads to the danger that simultaneous attacks are not detected in a timely manner, given that the few available specialists are absorbed in defending against other incidents. The scarce resources also make it more difficult to engage in the necessary comprehensive follow-up on incidents. In its Action Plan for Cyber Defence (APCD), the DDPS has identified the need for action and resources in the field of cyber defence, defined the mandates of the various agencies (especially the Armed Forces), and described what measures are taken to manage the tasks. 22