particular are reliant on effective regulation and policy making. In this regard, it reaffirms its commitment to securing independence, impartiality as well as sufficient human and financial capacity of respective regulatory authorities, in particular the Telecommunications and Radiocommunications Regulator (TRR) or any successor to it, which should operate in a stable and predictable regulatory environment in an efficient, effective, transparent and non-discriminatory manner. International commitments, specifically Section 5 of the Reference Paper included in the Vanuatu commitments undertaken in the context of acceding to the World Trade Organization, requires any regulatory body to be “separate from […] any supplier of basic telecommunications services. The decisions of and the procedures used by regulators shall be impartial with respect to all market participants.” Further to this, the international best practice, which the Government accepts, requires independence and impartiality of regulatory entities in relation to market players, consumers, but also with regard to political influence46. Independence does not mean a disregard of interests of the above-mentioned groups. On the contrary, their interests are important and should be taken into account in the regulatory process. Therefore an appropriate definition of independence is “keeping equal distance from all involved parties”47. In terms of independence from political influence, in particular, it is important to recognize that no regulator can be absolutely independent. It will always be constrained by laws, political realities, public sentiments, budgets, license provisions, etc.48 Absolute independence is neither possible, nor desirable. The international regulatory theory and practice also recognize that there is no requirement for a regulator to be independent from the Government’s longterm policy or its powers to formulate such policy—it is solely required to be independent from day-to-day undue interference49. Furthermore, appropriate controls are necessary to ensure that a regulator is acting in the public interest. Therefore it is important to achieve an appropriate degree of independence that would guarantee necessary freedom for a regulator to act for the long-term benefit of the society and implement long-term policy, without being distracted by short-term interests, while at the same time recognising the reality (and, to some extent, desirability) of various practical influences on the activities of the regulator50. In the context above, it is clear that the regulatory independence does not restrict the Government and the Minister responsible for a specific policy area, 46 Smith, W. (1997). ‘Utility Regulators—The Independence Debate’. Public Policy for the Private Sector. Note No. 127, October 1997, Washington, World Bank Group; Lamanauskas, T. (2006). ‘The Key Features of Independence of National Telecommunication Regulatory Authorities and Securing them in Law’ Teisė (Law). Research Papers. Vol. 61, 2006. P. 71-82. 47 Karnitis E. (2004). ‘Multi-Sectoral Regulation for Services of General Interest: the Latvia’s experience’. International conference “Legal aspects of the liberalisation of public utilities: practical issues and future trends”, Vilnius. 48 Jamison, M. A. (2004). Survival Guide for the Independent Regulator. Accessible at: http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/centers/ purc/documents/SurvivalGuidefortheIndependentRegulator.pdf. 49 Melody, W. H., Ed. (2001). Telecom Reform. Principles, Policies and Regulatory Practices. Denmark, Schultz DocuCenter. 50 Lamanauskas, T. (2006). ‘The Key Features of Independence of National Telecommunication Regulatory Authorities and Securing them in Law’. Teisė (Law). Research Papers. Vol. 61, 2006. P. 71-82. 38 National Information and Communication Technology Policy