44 Compendium: High Level Review of United Nations Sanctions mercially available information databases was also limited, either due to limited UN licences for such databases, or the reluctance of the Secretariat to subscribe. The Secretariat, on the other hand, reported that subscriptions to such databases were under-utilised, indicating a breakdown in communication between Expert Groups and the Secretariat. 41. The Secretary-General should authorise upon request access by expert groups to UN system reporting on relevant situations, including code cables and the DSS feed, on the condition that such information would only be used for background understanding and would not be cited in public reports without the consent of the originators. C. The Ombudsperson The contractual, administrative and staffing arrangements for the Ombudsperson are not adequate to the institutional importance and need for independence of the Ombudsperson. Concerns with respect to the impact of contractual and administrative arrangements are outlined in the Ombudsperson biannual reports to the Security Council.11 The Ombudsperson is subject to the same contractual terms and conditions as individual members of expert groups, despite significant differences between the Ombudsperson’s role relative to expert groups. Unlike experts, the Ombudsperson is not under the direction of the committee; in fact, the Ombudsperson’s independence from the committee and the Council is one of the key determinants of the Office’s legitimacy. The term and security of the Ombudsperson’s tenure is also vital to the position’s independence, an issue noted by the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism. 11 See 2 February 2015 (S/2015/80, paras. 52-53) and 31 July 2014 (S/2014/553, paras. 50-51): “While achieved in practice, in principle, no separate office has been established and the applicable administrative arrangements, particularly for budget, staffing, staff management and resource utilization, lack the critical features of autonomy. Further, the contractual arrangements for the Ombudsperson are not consistent with the mandate accorded by the Security Council and contain insufficient safeguards for independence .... urgent consideration needs to be given to establishing contractual arrangements and a structure that provides for institutional independence for the Ombudsperson and the Office of the Ombudsperson.