

## Annex 1:

### Options to Mainstream Gender Considerations at the 2021-25 OEWG

#### Objectives of this paper

Canada sees this annex to our position paper as an opportunity to present some options about how gender considerations could be mainstreamed and addressed by the OEWG. This paper will present a menu of options, some of which we hope might eventually get retained. Addressing gender considerations at the OEWG could be a means to reduce and prevent technology-facilitated and online gender-based violence. Doing so would add value to the OEWG's work, while building on the work of the 2019-21 OEWG on this issue. While this annex focuses on the OEWG, the options presented below might also be relevant as we seek to address gender issues at an eventual UN cyber Programme of Action (PoA).

#### Options for addressing gender considerations at the OEWG

##### *Broadening the acquis of past UN cyber processes on gender*

While gender has not featured prominently in UN cyber GGEs, this issue was raised by over 20 States at the 2019-21 OEWG. The 2021 OEWG [report](#) included several mentions of gender issues:

The OEWG welcomes the high level of participation of women delegates in its sessions and the prominence of gender perspectives in its discussions. The OEWG underscores the importance of narrowing the “gender digital divide” and of promoting the effective and meaningful participation and leadership of women in decision-making processes related to the use of ICTs in the context of international security. (page 3)

Capacity-building should respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, be gender sensitive and inclusive, universal and non-discriminatory. (page 8)

The [Chair's summary](#) that was attached to the 2021 OEWG report included several other proposals with regards to gender text, notably in summaries of discussions made by the Chair (pages 5 and 8), as well as in text proposals made by Canada (pages 11 and 13) and Ecuador (page 17). Canada had also made previous gender text [proposals](#) in November 2020 that were reflected in the final OEWG report or Chair's summary.

We hope that at the 2021-25 OEWG and at an eventual PoA, States will outline the importance of gender in their written submissions and verbal interventions and will explain why they think gender issues are important. States could indicate what they perceive as the most relevant ways to advance this issue, perhaps drawing from some of the options laid out in this paper. States may wish to make additional gender text proposals, or support gender text proposals made by others. Previous UN cyber reports offer limited views on the gender aspects of cyber security. Canada hopes that this acquis will grow as more and more States recognize the importance of this issue.

*Extending the Women in International Peace and Security in Cyberspace Fellowship Program to maintain gender parity at OEWG meetings*

The Women in International Peace and Security in Cyberspace Fellowship [program](#) funded the travel of 30-35 women diplomats to attend the UN OEWG meeting in February 2020, before the program went virtual because of the COVID crisis. This program allowed gender parity for the first time in a First Committee process, a fact that was noted by the UN OEWG chair. This program has been hailed as a major success that can be expanded on. Donors, which now include the US in addition to the initial five donors, are working on a revamped and expanded program, which we hope will build on the positive results achieved at the 2019-21 OEWG.

*Advancing gender equality via cyber capacity building*

In addition to the type of capacity building of diplomats outlined above, several States have suggested that the OEWG could play a useful role in identifying cyber capacity building gaps. States could then work with organizations such as the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise (GFCE) to coordinate existing and future capacity building efforts to address some of those gaps. One such gap could be implementing capacity building projects in a way that addresses the gender dimensions of cyber security. This could include specific elements such as assisting States in:

- mainstreaming gender considerations into cyber incident response and cyber legal framework regimes;
- designing responses to cyber incidents in a manner that takes into consideration the gendered impacts of these incidents;
- factoring in gender considerations into project design, including when it comes to cybersecurity standards and threat modelling;
- building cybersecurity skills and expertise beyond STEM, by expanding into areas such as communications, ethics and legal governance; and
- building a community of cyber incident responders that is more diverse, i.e. that includes a greater participation of women and members of the LGBTQ community.

Promoting gender-sensitive capacity building could thus become a key objective of the OEWG's discussions on cyber capacity building. Gender considerations could also be taken into account when determining which capacity building projects to fund in the context of the OEWG. This would serve as an incentive for implementing organizations to build in a gender component to their proposed projects.

*OEWG session on gender*

Rather than addressing the gender dimensions of cyber security via side events, as was done on the margins of the 2019-21 OEWG, the 2021-25 OEWG could have a session dedicated to this issue during one of the OEWG's regular substantive meetings. Experts on gender and cyber security from government, civil society and the private sector could be invited to provide insights and formulate concrete recommendations on this issue. Subtopics to discuss could include:

- gender-related threats, including how internet shutdowns and data breaches affect women and the LGBT community differently;
- gender mainstreaming in national cyber strategies;
- taking gender into account when implementing the 2015 GGE norms; and

- how to mainstream gender issues in the OEWG's work.

These topics could then also be discussed in subsequent OEWG meetings, with a view to assessing progress made to date and ways to further address gender considerations in the OEWG's work. As such, the OEWG could become a forum to exchange best practices on how to address gender issues in international cyber security work, whether at the UN, in States' domestic cyber security strategies, or elsewhere. States could also be encouraged to report back, during their regular statements at OEWG meetings, and through their responses to the annual survey, on how they are implementing the gender-relevant aspects of the acquis.

#### *Gender inclusive stakeholder modalities*

Canada hopes that the 2021-25 OEWG will adopt more open stakeholder modalities than those adopted at the 2019-21 OEWG, in order to ensure that women and other marginalised excluded constituencies' voice are heard. In Canada's view, adopting stakeholder modalities that allow the full participation of all relevant non-State actors (academia, civil society, the private sector and technical community) would result in richer discussions that are more reflective of the broader cyber security community's views. Many of these organizations have an important role to play in the implementation of the acquis of past GGEs and of the 2019-21 OEWG, including when it comes to the agreed norms of State behaviour in cyberspace. Allowing the full participation of non-State actors would also be helpful when it comes to the OEWG's discussions on gender issues. Most cyber diplomats are not gender experts. However, some stakeholders from the academic and NGO (especially human rights groups) communities are gender experts, or have relevant experience in this field. Their participation in OEWG deliberations would therefore enrich the OEWG's discussions on gender issues. It would likely result in the identification of concrete action items that could help address the gender dimensions of cyber security in the OEWG's work.

#### *Collecting gender disaggregated data and undertaking additional research on gender and cyber*

During the 2019-21 OEWG, Canada identified a research gap when it came to addressing the gender aspects of cyber security. We therefore funded two papers, [one](#) by an academic and [one](#) by civil society researchers. Since then, other research on this issue has been carried out, including by [UNIDIR](#). Additional research in this area would be beneficial. Its authors could present their work during OEWG sessions or side events on gender issues and their papers could inform the OEWG's work on gender and cyber security.

There is also a need for more data disaggregated by gender, including baseline data. This was a recommendation made in the 2018 SALW PoA report in the small arms context. In the cyber context, the research [paper](#) drafted by Brown and Pytlak recommended that "all actors should maintain sex- or gender-disaggregated participation records for all cyber security related work (diplomacy, capacity building, incident response, etc.)."<sup>1</sup>

Similarly, UNIDIR's [paper](#) recommended that "international standards organizations, in cooperation with national standards bodies, should identify, and collect data on, the areas where cybersecurity standards have gender effects."<sup>2</sup> Collecting more such data would be useful to

<sup>1</sup> Allison Pytlak and Deborah Brown, [Why Gender Matters in International Cyber Security](#), April 2020, p. 22.

<sup>2</sup> Katharine Millar, James Shires, [Tatiana Tropina, Gender Approaches to Cyber Security](#), January 2021, p. 25.

inform the OEWG's work on gender issues and help identify gender-related gaps in cyber capacity building and research, and shed more light on the gendered impacts of cyber operations.

#### Conclusion

The above is meant as an initial menu of options that lays out how the 2021-25 OEWG could address the gender aspects of cyber security. We welcome the views of other States on these options, as well as any other options that they may wish to add to the list. We hope that some of these options will inform the OEWG's work on gender issues.