

# WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

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# Foreword by the Minister of Defence of the Slovak Republic

In response to the worsening situation in the area of national defence the Slovak Government released a document named *White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic* in 2013 as the main politico-strategic product of the Strategic Defence Review. For the first time in a long while, this document projected the long-term development of ensuring national defence up to the year 2024. Life brings change, however, and to a greater or lesser degree this change can influence our intentions and their materialisation. This document is a case in point.

Developments in Ukraine in 2014 presented a fundamental change in the security environment in Europe, which steadily grew worse after the destabilisation of the Greater Middle East and a concomitant growth of security risks for the Slovak Republic and her Allies. The era of a stable security environment with low risks in the external environment, considered as a matter of course by some, is over. Security threats have become more real and directly influence the security interests of the Slovak Republic. Measures undertaken in reaction to this not only in Slovakia but also at the level of NATO and the EU have not undermined the validity of the key tenets of the *White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic* from 2013. They did influence its implementation, however, especially in the area of armament. Steps taken in the past were enough to halt the decline of our armed forces but not enough to overcome all serious shortfalls.

This called for a review of the current situation and the need to determine the right course of further national defence development until 2030, while taking into account not only probable developments in the security environment, but the resources available as well. The result of this review is the new *White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic*. The clear and urgent imperative of this document is the need to strengthen the ability of the Slovak Republic, in all its complexities, to defend itself, especially focusing on increasing the readiness and war-fighting ability of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic.

The *White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic* stresses the fact that the Slovak Republic is primarily responsible for its own defence. It highlights the need to prepare for all scenarios, not excluding the most dire of scenarios in the form of a direct attack on the Slovak Republic. This calls for developing the individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. The document in front of you contains a set of measures pertaining to key areas of ensuring national defence. These take into account tasks resulting from the common efforts in NATO, especially measures strengthening collective defence.

Improving national defence management, especially in war-time, is a key measure requiring improvements in intelligence, decision-making processes, planning, preparing state authorities for national defence and other areas.

Increasing readiness and the war-fighting ability of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic is built on two key areas of their transformation. First, human resources are the most

valuable asset we have and therefore emphasis is laid on increasing the moral qualities, level of education and expertise of professional soldiers. The second pillar is composed of military hardware, the most expensive segment of capability development, while its replacement or modernisation is key to progress in transforming the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic. As threats to national security are more tangible, a greater emphasis on heavier hardware with greater fire-power, manoeuvrability and ballistic protection is in demand. The development of infrastructure utilised by the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic will respond to the poor condition of several of its elements, including its educational and training base.

At the same time, the White Paper emphasises the importance of support given to the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic by other elements of the system of national defence in case of an armed confrontation, as well as of the host nation support given to allied forces while they operate on Slovak territory.

The most important means of implementing development aims will be a functioning defence planning process bridging strategic aims, programming priorities and budgetary considerations with the acquisition process.

Last but not least, this important document emphasises the need to strengthen the trust of the public in national defence, to deepen patriotism and the defence-awareness of citizens in the spirit of national and military traditions, as well as the need to increase the quality of preparation of the general population for national defence.

My life-long experiences in the armed forces have confirmed me in my opinion that ensuring national defence is conditional on fulfilling its long-term needs, which in turn requires continuity of approach and solutions with a guarantee of funding across several electoral terms. This was one of the reasons why we submitted the draft of this White Paper to a wide public discussion before the official release by the Government. The opportunity to express their opinion within the scope of this discussion was therefore open not only to government institutions but also to members of the appropriate parliamentary committee, several former ministers of defence, former state secretaries of the ministry of defence, former Chiefs of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, representatives of the non-governmental sector including professional interest groups, representatives of selected union organisations, the Slovak Security and Defence Industry Association and last but not least, the general public. After all, national defence is not leftist or rightist, it does not exclusively concern either the governing coalition or the opposition, nor is it the responsibility of the state or professional soldiers and employees of the MoD only. As stated in the *Constitution of the Slovak Republic*, defence of the Slovak Republic is a duty and a question of honour of its citizens. I hope that in this way a deepened sense of shared responsibility for its implementation has been achieved.

It is especially important because the *White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic* constitutes a strategic vision and a comprehensive point of departure for enhancing the ability of the Slovak Republic to defend itself. This document will be followed by further decisions, including the adoption of a long-term Armed Forces development plan, a new *Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic*, a conceptual framework of how to develop the system of national defence and last but not least, armament projects for the Armed Forces. In all these cases we seek political and public support.

In closing, I would like to express my thanks to all who took part in drafting this document including the external expert community and to all who will actively contribute to its implementation.

**Peter GAJDOŠ**  
**Minister of Defence**  
**of the Slovak Republic**



# Foreword by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic

As an independent state the Slovak Republic fulfils its functions in many areas. An important part of statehood is the ability of a state to secure its sovereignty, territorial integrity and, last but not least, the security and protection of its citizens. By joining NATO, undoubtedly the most important international security structure, we took upon ourselves the commitment to contribute to stability and security in the international environment but at the same time the commitment to maintain and develop capabilities ensuring our own security and the ability to defend ourselves.

Many factors, which are currently undergoing fundamental changes, influence the character and the level to which tasks are fulfilled by the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic. This fact calls for a re-evaluation of the basis and aims of military capability development of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic necessary for ensuring national defence.

In 2013 a *White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic* was released, which defined the long-term development framework for the armed forces including proposals on how to insure its funding. Changes in external factors, especially the recent fundamental change of the security environment, as well as military and non-military threats and risks have led us to the re-evaluation of aims and means of achieving them.

The aim of this *White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic* is to provide a politico-strategic framework for the long-term development of ensuring national defence, concentrating on the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, while maintaining the status of a trustworthy and equal partner enjoyed by Slovakia within the EU and NATO.

The need to enhance the ability of the Slovak Republic to defend itself, an increase in the number of tasks for the Armed Forces and the fulfilment of international obligations require a higher standard of our military capabilities. Our Armed Forces will need to have not only an enhanced war-fighting potential, more effective combat support and combat service support, but also higher readiness – for both collective defence and crisis management.

Part of the updated *White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic* is an Armed Forces development concept and a strategy of how to implement it by 2030. This concept lays out the force structure and the capabilities of the Armed Forces necessary to ensure the defence of the Slovak Republic, as well as to fulfil its international obligations. In my view the decisive criterion of the development of the Armed Forces is the modernisation of military hardware and the replacement of outdated equipment and other materiel of tactical units.

In spite of the recently increased efforts to modernise the Armed Forces and enhance their training, it has not been possible to completely halt the declining trend of both the quality of capabilities and of the ability of the Armed Forces to perform tasks to the extent required. This state of affairs considerably effects the ability of the Armed Forces to perform tasks in the state of

security and at the same time lessens their ability to flexibly perform tasks particularly related to the preparation for their mission, the ability to perform tasks related to Slovakia's commitments in NATO and the EU, but also concerning operations and missions abroad. For these reasons our efforts in the upcoming years will be focused on maintaining and perhaps enhancing the capabilities of the Armed Forces, along with gradually improving their overall readiness. The expected end-state are well equipped and well trained Armed Forces with enhanced capabilities and interoperability with allied forces.

Maintaining combat capabilities and overall battle-worthiness of the Armed Forces, and also their ability to perform set tasks without fundamental shortfalls and limitations will require a conceptual approach to capability development. This will require the drafting of a long-term Armed Forces development plan, as well as adopting effective measures for the preparation and implementation of development projects of major military equipment.

The requirements of operational readiness and interoperability of the Armed Forces with allied forces demand comprehensive training – both national and international. That is why, besides outfitting the Armed Forces with modern equipment living up to current standards, I consider ensuring high quality training as especially important in order to improve combat capabilities, as well as to forward the overall transformation of the Armed Forces. In the upcoming years we will continue with the intensity and improvement of training focusing on collective defence of Slovak territory according to Art. 5 of the *North Atlantic Treaty*.

As the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic I believe that the intentions of this document will have a considerable influence on capability development of the Armed Forces. For this to happen, it is necessary for these intentions to be transformed into tangible deeds, which must not only have the support of the political leadership, but a sufficient allocation of resources. If this occurs, this document will be a relevant basis for the drafting and implementation of strategic and planning documents of the Armed Forces development, which will in the end bring about the achievement of the set aim of increasing the responsiveness and the war-fighting ability of our Armed Forces.

**General Milan MAXIM**  
**Chief of the General Staff**  
**of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic**



# Executive Summary

## Key results of the implementation of the White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic

The *White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic* (2013) evaluated the condition of national defence in a comprehensive manner and provided a politico-strategic framework of its long-term development, the gradual implementation of which was begun. The implementation of this document was influenced by a fundamental change in the security environment and by corresponding measures taken at the national level, as well as at the NATO and the EU levels.

In this context the **key results** of its implementation are as follows:

- the process of updating the strategic and conceptual framework of national defence has begun,
- the level of defence spending in real terms as well as in relation to the national GDP has been stabilised and started to grow, decisions have been taken to manage allocated resources more effectively,
- conditions have been created to retain highly qualified military personnel and to foster the long-term sustainability of the specialised social welfare system of professional soldiers, the nominal military personnel strength of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic (AF SR) has been increased along with the actual number of professional soldiers,
- the largest Air Force armament projects in the history of independent Slovakia have been launched, the effects of which will be seen in the coming years,
- the spectrum of capabilities of the AF SR has been maintained, the overall level of their interoperability according to NATO standards has not changed significantly.

These and other measures **have prevented the loss of some capabilities and created the conditions for a reboot of the AF SR transformation process.** The level of providing national defence remains, however, under the negative sway of:

- the condition of national defence management,
- a marked long-term imbalance between tasks and allocated resources,
- the ineffectiveness of the defence planning system and a lack of interconnectedness of strategic aims, programming priorities, budget and procurement,
- a lower level of readiness of the AF SR, particularly as a result of
  - under-manning of AF SR units,
  - restrictions on AF SR training,
  - the fact that most major military equipment is obsolete, have a low level of serviceability and parameters unfit for both the modern battlefield and for interoperability with allied forces,
- a lag in AF SR capability development,
- AF SR stockpile deficits,
- the bad technical condition and obsolescence of infrastructure managed by the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic (MoD).

### Key measures

- **increasing the ability to defend the Slovak Republic:**
  - consistently live-up to the responsibilities of the Slovak Republic concerning its defence,
  - deepen the synergy of individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack,

- a gradual increase of defence spending in keeping with the needs of defending the Slovak Republic and commitments towards Allies,
- apportion at least 20% of defence spending on major equipment, including related research and development,
- enhance the defence planning system,
- intensify communication with the public concerning national defence,
- create conditions conducive to improving the preparedness of the general population for national defence,
- deepen the comprehensive approach to national defence including the development of capacities to support the operations of the AF SR in defence of the Slovak Republic, as well as Host Nation Support capacities of the Slovak Republic,
- support the involvement of the Slovak defence industry in providing equipment and other materiel for the AF SR, and promote its products abroad;
- **improvement of national defence management:**
  - increase preparedness of state authorities to organise and ensure national defence,
  - improvement of intelligence, the early warning system and situational awareness,
  - introduction of comprehensive planning of national defence,
  - harmonising functional ties of the national crisis response system measures and NATO Crisis Response System measures, as well as enhancing the compatibility of systems for transmitting classified information;
- **enhanced readiness of the AF SR:**
  - a gradual enhancement of the capabilities of the AF SR in the context of their transformation;
  - ensuring a balanced development of the AF SR – Land Forces, the Air Force and Special Operations Forces,
  - enhancing the capacities of combat units, units for combat support and combat service support,
  - improving equipment and other materiel, including communication and information systems,
  - achieving and maintaining full operational capability of a mechanised brigade,
  - increase in readiness and capabilities of forces also employable in counter-terrorist operations,
  - increase the manning levels of AF SR units,
  - increase the moral qualities, as well as the level of education and expertise of professional soldiers to perform tasks connected with the defence of the Slovak Republic and the defence of Allies,
  - increase the intensity of training focusing on defending the Slovak Republic and her Allies,
  - improve the command and control systems in the AF SR,
  - a gradual increase in the stockpiles necessary to perform tasks connected with national defence,
  - development of infrastructure managed by the MoD according to set priorities, including the development of the educational and training base.

**Achieving the development aims depends upon the size of the Slovak defence budget and the effectiveness of Slovak defence spending.**




**The Czechoslovak Army Corps Memorial at Dukla, the scene of the heaviest fighting on our territory during WWII.**



**Clashes of Hurban's volunteers in and around Brezová pod Bradlom are amongst the most significant sources of national military traditions.**



**It is necessary to constantly remind people, and especially the young generations, of the legacy of the Slovak National Uprising.**





*In the past Slovaks repeatedly proved that they are not opposed to rising up in arms against injustice.*



*The last conscripts left their barracks in 2005.*

*Milan Rastislav Štefánik – one of our most distinguished figures in history.*



# The Evolution of the Military Arts in Slovakia Through History

The Slovak Republic in the context of European history has been in existence as an independent, sovereign state only briefly. The history of the Slovak nation, however, goes back further than that, all the way to the early Middle Ages. The population of the territory of what is today Slovakia has since then repeatedly struggled, often up in arms, for either their survival, freedom or statehood.

## National and military traditions of Slovakia

For centuries, Slovakia had been part of multinational states and Slovak soldiers served and fought in the armies of these states, many of them gaining widespread recognition either as commanders or ordinary soldiers, leaving a permanent imprint on European military history.<sup>1</sup>

The first truly Slovak national military units were formed during the revolutionary years of 1848 - 1849. The Slovak volunteer corps organised by the Slovak National Council as the national revolutionary authority fought until the end of the revolution in the autumn of 1849, when they were dissolved. Their military traditions remain permanently in the minds of the Slovak population and Slovak soldiers proudly harked back to them in all other struggles for national freedom and equality.

The idea of restoring a Slovak volunteer army, which would be involved in the struggle for national liberation, independence and equality, was raised for the second time during World War I by Milan Rastislav Štefánik. Later, a combined force was organised upon the emergence of a joint Czecho-Slovak resistance movement in order to jointly gain national freedom for Slovaks and Czechs.

Czecho-Slovak troops abroad (later called the Czechoslovak Legions) began to be organised in the years 1914 - 1915 on the territory of Russia and France. The most numerous were the legions in Italy; they were formed just before the end of the war and played a role especially in October - November of 1918. These legions contributed to the victory of the Entente, but mainly helped the domestic and foreign resistance movement of Slovaks and Czechs in creating and gaining international recognition of the Czecho-Slovak state.

The Czecho-Slovak state (the Czechoslovak Republic), which was established on the 28 October 1918, built its army mainly from members of the Czechoslovak Legions. The army was prepared for territorial defence and by European standards was very well equipped and trained.

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<sup>1</sup>) E.g. Field Marshal Andrej Hadik, a descendant of a small Slovak noble family, as commander of a Habsburg hussar regiment took Berlin during the Seven Years' War in 1757 and permanently left an imprint on military history by this "escapade". Later on, he held the office of the President of the Court War Council in the Habsburg Monarchy, which can be compared to the current Minister of Defence (War). Similarly, Ladislav Škultéty-Gábris, the Habsburg soldier of the 18th and 19th century, is considered the longest-serving soldier of all time, as he served 81 years in the army.

On Hitler's insistence the Slovak state was established on the 14 March 1939 (named the Slovak Republic after July of 1939); its army organisation was subsequently formed on the basis of the Czechoslovak Army located in Slovakia. The Officer Corps was formed mainly from drafted reserve officers, especially teachers, which contributed to the fact that the armed forces had not become the backbone of the regime. During their deployment on the Eastern Front in the years 1941 - 1943, Slovak soldiers first individually, and then in whole groups defected to the Allied side of the front where they primarily enlisted with the Czecho-Slovak foreign army fighting on the side of the Allies.

The gradually growing anti-Hitler mood among the officers led to the preparation of the armed anti-fascist rising of the Slovak Army in the Slovak National Uprising. The armed resistance began on 29 August 1944 when German troops tried to seize control of the territory of the Slovak Republic. The Slovak rebel army managed to fight for two months in the open, yet it did not surrender even after that time. Some units endured in guerrilla fighting until the arrival of the front at the turn of 1944 - 1945, some until liberation in April - May of 1945. The armed uprising of the Slovak soldiers and partisans of 29 August 1944 was one of the largest and longest analogous military risings against Nazi Germany in Europe.

Many anti-fascist-minded Slovaks in World War II also took part in the Allied struggle to defeat Nazi Germany as part of the foreign Czecho-Slovak resistance. Thousands of Slovaks fought together with Czechs in battles of the Western Front: in the Battle of Britain, in the Middle East, as well as in the fighting on the Eastern Front in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Czechoslovak Republic was restored at the end of the war as an achievement of their struggles.

The new armed forces were built primarily on the basis of foreign troops, particularly the 1<sup>st</sup> Czechoslovak Army Corps in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. After the communist coup in 1948, the armed forces became an instrument of power of the communist regime, and since 1955, one of the Warsaw Pact armies. The development of the Army, the education and training of its members met the principles and requirements of Soviet political and military doctrines.

The end of the Cold War at the turn of 1989 - 1990 also meant a call for the transformation of the armed forces to the conditions of a democratic polity in a new security environment. This was reflected not only in the creation of new military-strategic principles of the development and employment of the armed forces, but also in promoting the gradual democratic changes in the management of the army and also the process of humanising military service.

These important historical events and milestones, especially those related to the fight of Slovaks for national freedom against national oppression, for the European ideals of humanism, egalitarianism and equality, against fascism and war, and also the fight for peace and democracy form the basis of military and martial traditions of Slovakia.

### **Forming the Army of the Independent Slovak Republic**

On 1 January 1993, a peaceful split of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic into two independent states took place in parallel with the division of the federal army and the formation of

the Army of the Slovak Republic, from which the AF SR were created by gradual transformation by 1 July 2002.

The formation of new, fully-fledged Armed Forces of a sovereign state required a transformation from the offensively-minded mass army with a predominance of heavy military equipment into such Armed Forces that are smaller, modern, well-trained and which, in addition to defending the Slovak Republic, would also fulfil international commitments, including participation in operations and missions abroad. A decisive factor in the evolution of the security and defence policy of the Slovak Republic was the fact that the political decision makers were in favour of its Euro-Atlantic orientation.

**In the period between 1993 and 1997**, the first politico-strategic documents of the Slovak Republic in the realm of defence were adopted (*The Defence Doctrine of the Slovak Republic* in 1994, *The Fundamental Objectives and Principles of National Security of the Slovak Republic* in 1996). They suited the times both in character and content. The fact that the Slovak Republic was not invited to NATO in the first round of enlargement had a significantly negative impact on the overall reform efforts, which at the end of the 90s resulted in a lower readiness levels of the Army of the Slovak Republic.

**The period from 1998 until 2003** saw qualitative changes in the security and defence policy of the Slovak Republic related to the intensification of integration efforts and the subsequent invitation of the Slovak Republic to negotiations on its accession to NATO. For the first time in the history of the Slovak Republic, standard strategic documents were approved in 2001 (*The Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic*, *The Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic*, and *The Military Strategy of the Slovak Republic*) which defined the objectives and tasks of the security and defence policy of a democratic state aspiring to join NATO and the EU.

Subsequently in 2002, the *Long-Term Plan of the Structure and Development of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic - the Development Plan and Programs, Including Their Financial Demands* (Model 2010) was adopted. Although it still focused on the individual and territorial defence of the Slovak Republic, it created space for integration with NATO. For the first time, the necessary long-term resource framework of the MoD was defined and guaranteed by resolutions of both the Government and the National Council of the Slovak Republic, which did not, however, materialise.

During this period, related legislation that formed the basis for change in the approach to defence capacities development planning, including the Armed Forces in the context of Euro-Atlantic integration, was also adopted. In March 2003, as a pre-condition of NATO accession, the Slovak Government approved the *Implementation Timetable of Reforms* which defined individual reform steps and guaranteed the commitment of the Government of the Slovak Republic to allocate the necessary resources for defence.

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<sup>2)</sup> By 30 June 2002, the Armed Forces consisted of three separate elements - the Army of the Slovak Republic, the Troops of the Ministry of Interior and the Railway Troops. From 1 July 2002, the Army of the Slovak Republic was officially renamed as the AF SR (consisted of the Land Forces of the AF SR, the Air Force of the AF SR and the Training and Support Forces of the AF SR) with the Railway Troops and the Troops of the Ministry of Interior dissolved as of 31 December 2002. The Training and Support Forces of the AF SR were dissolved as of 30 November 2014, with their elements amalgamated with other parts of the AF SR.

**In the period between 2004 and 2008**, the defence efforts of the Slovak Republic were dominated by tasks relating to NATO and EU membership. In 2005, new strategic documents were approved (*The Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic* and *The Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic*) which were fully compatible with the strategic documents of the EU and NATO and defined the new nature of the defence of the Slovak Republic in the framework of collective defence, formulating requirements arising from the transition from territorial defence to defending interests. These documents together with the adoption and amendments to relevant legislation created a corresponding strategic and legal framework concerning the defence of the Slovak Republic as part of collective defence and the meeting of other NATO and EU commitments.

In 2005, a new conceptual document, the *Long-Term Development Plan of the Ministry of Defence Until 2015* (Model 2015), which placed emphasis on building expeditionary forces while at the same time, in contrast to Model 2010, predicting a lower level of defence spending, was approved. Its implementation has also not materialised. Transformation was therefore carried out by emphasising peace-time tasks of the AF SR, which led to a deterioration of their capacities and capabilities to carry out war-time tasks. The implementation of plans lagged behind as well, which was negatively reflected particularly in the process of modernising major military equipment. On 1 January 2006, the AF SR became fully professional with conscription legally retained.

**Since 2009**, the unfavourable situation in the Armed Forces has been amplified by the effects of the economic crisis on defence spending, the level of which received a significant downward trend. At the same time, the growing demand for capabilities development and a gradual shift in proportion from their participation in missions and operations abroad in favour of NATO-led operations brought with it increased demands on human, material, but in particular financial resources. It was confirmed that organisational changes in the AF SR aimed at lowering numbers of personnel, which was the key characteristic of their transformation since 1993, do not achieve the desired effect, i.e. use of saved funds for the acquisition of equipment and other materiel, including communication and information systems.

The slowdown in the transformation of the Armed Forces began to gradually limit the carrying out of their basic tasks. The urgent need to define new parameters for the long-term development of ensuring national defence with an emphasis on the projection of the future development of the Armed Forces, while responding primarily to the reduced levels of defence spending, resulted in the initiation of the Strategic Defence Review process in the second half of 2010.

Drafting of its key outputs was delayed by the fall of the Government in the autumn of 2011 and did not result in the adoption of fundamental documents in that election term. For this reason, the lack of a realistic framework of long-term development of the AF SR with suitable budgetary backing that existed since 2007 (the year when Model 2015 was abandoned) persisted. This in turn delayed systemic solutions with implications for the ability of the Slovak Republic to defend itself. After the early parliamentary elections of 2012 the new Government of the Slovak Republic continued with the Strategic Defence Review process and released the *White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic* in 2013.



*Military training  
simulating conditions  
of real deployment.*



*Policing of Slovak  
air-space is ensured  
by MiG-29 fighter  
aircraft.*



*Howitzers produced by  
the Slovak defence  
industry are  
world-class.*







Carrying out duties in the field using camouflage.

For the first time soldiers carried out live-fire exercises of the S-300 anti-aircraft rocket system in Bulgaria in 2015.



# Implementation of the White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic (2013)

## 1.1 Introductory context

- 1) The *White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic* (2013), being the main output of the Strategic Defence Review process, provided a politico-strategic framework of long-term development of ensuring national defence. This has been absent for several years. The *White Paper* also laid the foundation for a systematic and coordinated approach to national defence development in the upcoming years.
- 2) The rise of instability in the east and south of EU borders resulting from armed conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, including the increased threats of terrorism and mass migration worsened the security environment in Europe with global implications. Threats have become more real and dangerous, whilst the probability of their materialising has become relative and the reaction-time required for adequate decision-making has been diminished.
- 3) In reaction to the worsened security environment various measures had been undertaken: a number of operative measures at the national level in order to maintain national security and to minimise security risks; measures undertaken at the NATO level aimed at enhancing its readiness and responsiveness and measures undertaken at the EU level, including sanctions and the revision of the strategic framework of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. The change of the security environment, being of a fundamental and long-term nature, demands a comprehensive, systemic and equally long-term response in the area of national defence.

## 1.2 Meeting The Defence Policy's Main Aim

- 4) According to the *Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic* (2005), Slovakia considered the main aim of its defence policy to be the security of



its citizens and ensuring national defence, by utilising both national defence capacities as well as opportunities provided by collective defence, along with an active participation in building peace and global stability, conflict prevention, crisis resolution and in confidence building.

5) The main aim of defence policy of the Slovak Republic was met despite the changing security environment, with higher risks arising, however, from both the condition of national defence capacities, as well as AF SR interoperability levels with allied forces in the context of long-term development deficits from the past. The process of meeting this aim was therefore focused on halting negative trends as regards AF SR capabilities by implementing measures set out in the *White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic* (2013).

The main aim of the defence policy was met despite higher risks arising from the condition of national defence capacities

## 1.3 The Defence Efforts of the Slovak Republic

6) The basis and axioms of the *White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic* (2013) are of a long-term character. The fundamental change of the security environment in Europe and the worsened security situation in her neighbourhood highlighted the need for an enhanced defence effort of the Slovak Republic.

7) By setting aims and providing a strategy of how to proceed in enhancing the ability of Slovakia to defend itself, the *White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic* (2013) provided conditions for effective resource allocation, which in turn was a pre-requisite for positive changes in the resource backing of national defence.

8) Despite a rigorous consolidation of public finances, planning assumptions concerning the evolution of defence spending as set out in the *White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic* (2013) were honoured. This was achieved by stabilising defence spending as a percentage of GDP beginning in 2013 (circa 1%), increasing defence spending in real terms beginning in 2014 and increasing it as a percentage of GDP (circa 1.1%) beginning in 2015. Decisions of the Government concerning investments into modernisation supported the rise of defence spending. As regards defence spending levels, there persisted an imbalance in the set tasks and resources allocated for their execution.

There persisted an imbalance between tasks and resources

9) A number of measures have been undertaken by the MoD in order to better utilise resources, especially in the area of infrastructure (for example: the centralisation of immovable assets management and the reduction of costs through the MoD relinquishing infrastructure) and the operation of joint stock companies (entry of a strategic partner into companies, mergers

of companies and rationalisation of structures), as well as measures to increase the effectiveness of procurement (for example the use of electronic auctioning/electronic marketplace, use of services provided by NATO agencies to procure certain commodities). The MoD to a greater extent drew on foreign military aid and EU funding.

10) The conceptual framework of optimising defence planning system (processes) was not satisfactorily implemented. Primarily due to the lack of a long-term plan and due to decisions made in the area of investing in major military equipment brought on by changes in the security environment, a disjointed relationship was created between strategic aims, programming priorities and budgetary priorities with procurement.

## 1.4 Defence Management, the MoD and its Ancillary Elements

The process of reviewing and updating the Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic (2005) had begun

11) In keeping with measures set out in the *White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic* (2013), the process of reviewing and updating the *Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic* (2005) had begun. In connection with this, the preparation of the *System of National Defence Development Concept*, as the basis of enhancing the quality of this system and particularly its managerial element had also begun. This process was influenced by the fundamental change of the security environment and the decision of the Government to prepare these documents in succession to the *Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic*. Findings from this process were utilised in drafting legislation. A set of situational plans for utilising the AF SR in crisis situations and the internal framework of crisis management at the MoD were updated.

12) Demands on streamlining MoD activities were only partially met within the framework of rationalising the administrative structure of the MoD and its ancillary agencies and facilities. Basic systemic conditions for enhancing the ability to perform tasks by the MoD were created, especially in the area of national defence management and human resources development. Developments in the security environment highlighted the need to enhance the readiness of the MoD to perform tasks in war-time, which only confirms that the optimisation of its administrative structure is incomplete.

13) Semi-budgetary organisations, most of the budgetary organisations and the state-owned company managed by the MoD were, in the context of the needs of national defence, retained and they implemented measures to streamline operations. The Military Police was also reorganised, while its direct subordination to the Minister of Defence has not been altered. The merger of the Military Intelligence Service and the Military Defence Intelligence into Military Intelligence made its management and resource allocation in information gathering more efficient.

14) The entry of a strategic partner by a long-term lease of property into two defence industry joint stock companies managed by the MoD and the merger of these companies into the *Aircraft Repair Company Trenčín JSC* advanced its economic stability, while other measures supported the innovation of its production program. By taking over the management of the state-owned *DMD GROUP JSC*, the MoD created conditions necessary for the development of its military equipment production and maintenance, especially of artillery platforms and those necessary for enhancing the quality of state property management in this regard. Merging three joint stock companies, managed by the MoD, that provided recreational and health services, into one – *HOREZZA JSC*, and streamlining its structure enhanced its economic performance and made investment into the quality of provided services possible.

## 1.5 Long-Term Projections of Armed Forces Development (Capability Development)

15) Measures of the *White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic* (2013) planned for the end of 2015 were taken according to available resources. The spectrum of AF SR capabilities was maintained, flat reductions in the number of professional soldiers were stayed and inexpensive organisational changes were carried out in the AF SR structures along with the strengthening of combat elements to the prejudice of command and support elements. The optimisation of logistic functionality was not completed in a comprehensive manner. The intent in the area of reviewing military doctrines, including the revision the *AF SR Doctrine (C)*, remains unachieved.

16) The enhancement of the intensity of AF SR training was begun, including live fire exercises and exercises with allied forces focusing, especially in the Land Forces, on defending the Slovak Republic. Joint preparation and involvement of the AF SR in exercises with key elements of the Integrated Rescue System was intensified. AF SR training remained significantly curtailed, however.

17) The drop in the manning levels of AF SR units has been halted (in 2015 manning was at circa 83.5%) by increasing the number of professional soldiers resulting from higher recruitment and lower rates of leaving the service, despite an increase in the AF SR nominal number strength in connection with creating units in line with the AF SR model (for example a motorised battalion, an Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance battalion - ISTAR). Shortfalls in specialised positions and an increase in the average age of professional soldiers persist.

18) In connection with the changes in the security environment and following the decisions of the Government, the progression of AF SR armament projects has been altered in favour of air force equipment. By approving the *AF SR Air Force Development Concept* (2014) the Government gave direction to air force development.

19) As a result of the changed progression of armament projects, as well as financial constraints, the former priority intent of outfitting a battalion with multirole tactical vehicles, and other equipment and materiel remains unachieved. Enhancing the combat potential of armoured vehicles already in use was begun (the modernisation of Infantry Fighting Vehicles). Despite advances in building a mobile communication system (MOKYS) for a mechanised battalion group, the desired end-state of the command, control, communication, computers and intelligence system (C4I) with an appropriate security certificate was not achieved.

The AF SR are markedly lagging in capability development

20) In the context of achieved results as regards the implementation of development intentions, as well as in view of long-term development deficits, the obsolescence of major military equipment, materiel shortfalls, communication and information systems limits and in military personnel preparedness shortfalls persist. These are the reasons why the AF SR are markedly lagging behind in both capability development and in meeting NATO interoperability standards – against the 2015 standards, their levels were at about 50% of measureable indicators.

## 1.6 Human Resources Development in the scope of the MoD

The passing of new legislation concerning the military service of professional soldiers

21) New legislation concerning the military service of professional soldiers created conditions to retain highly qualified military personnel at the operational and strategic levels in the AF SR command structure and introduced a short term form of military service to meet AF SR manning needs. Since this legislation was passed at the end of 2015, its positive contribution has not yet been felt. Preconditions for the long-term sustainability of the specialised social welfare system of professional soldiers have been created by the amendment of legislation dealing with the social welfare of policemen and soldiers.

22) In order to increase the quality of military preparation of personnel, the military character of education provided by the AF SR Academy of Milan Rastislav Štefánik was strengthened and other measures focusing on specific areas of expertise were adopted, including the possibility of attending a civilian university.

23) By adjusting legislation, conditions were created to enhance the effectiveness of AF SR active reserves, preparations for tasks connected with national defence and other emergencies. New legislation introduced a new source of personnel for AF SR reserves in the form of voluntary military training for citizens. Training of active reserves has not as yet been carried out.

Conditions were created to enhance the effectiveness of active reserves and to improve voluntary military training

24) Care for families of professional soldiers sent to perform tasks abroad has been conceptually elaborated, along with the creation of a new military specialisation – a social services and consulting expert, whose task it is, amongst others, to develop social work and carry out methodological guidance in the area of providing care for the families of professional soldiers. A concept of caring for war veterans has also been elaborated.

25) A separate concept for the personnel management of MoD employees has not been drafted. Measures of the *White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic* (2013) in the area of improving and replenishing civilian personnel were implemented according to legislation concerning the civil service, focusing on education.

## 1.7 Armament

26) The fundamental change of the security environment followed by EU sanctions placed on the Russian Federation, along with the condition of AF SR hardware, influenced not only the conceptual designs of AF SR development, but also the course of their armament aimed at reducing the technological dependence of the AF SR on the Russian Federation, which led to preferential investment into the Air Force.

27) An era of the largest investment projects in the history of the Slovak Republic was begun – the purchase of transport aircraft and multirole helicopters approved by the Government and other major projects were considered – the replacement of radar equipment and ensuring that Slovakia has a multirole tactical airplane capability (fighter aircraft). A 4x4 multirole tactical vehicle project has also been prepared. Both the projects that are under way and those that are being prepared constitute a breakthrough in AF SR rearmament. The practical repercussions of these changes will, however, be felt in 2018 - 2019 and later, after this equipment is delivered.

The largest armament projects are under way

28) Delivered to the AF SR were primarily automotive equipment and different categories of light weapons for infantry and materiel for Special Operations Forces (SOF). Three L-410 light transport aircraft were replaced.

29) The modernisation that was undertaken did not dispose of the long-term shortfalls pointed out in the *White Paper on Defence of the Slovak*



**The modernisation that was undertaken did not dispose of long-term shortfalls**

*Republic* (2013) and manifested themselves as shortfalls in parts of and obsolescence in most equipment, materiel, including communication and information systems (the life span of much of the major military equipment has expired). These factors do not permit the achievement of AF SR capabilities required for national defence and most of this kind of equipment is faulty and unserviceable.

30) Based on the evaluation of the potential for modernisation or the replacement of military hardware, the modernisation of Infantry Fighting Vehicles was begun. This brings with it not only enhanced tactical and technical parameters but also considerable support to the Slovak defence industry by including it in this modernisation. Services of NATO agencies (the procurement of small all-terrain vehicles and ammunition) and direct inter-governmental cooperation were utilised to a greater extent in arms procurement.

## 1.8 State Property Management and Infrastructure at the MoD

31) The extent of property managed by the MoD gradually decreased as a result of changes in the organisation of the AF SR and the stationing of their units and the placement of facilities. Maintenance costs were reduced by a more effective management of immovable property and by more frequently utilising employees rather than outsourcing tasks.

32) Only a limited number of infrastructure development projects were launched. These focused on priorities like the specialised Training Center - Lešť and smaller projects in the area of airport infrastructure, fuel storage, facility security (handling of classified information) and the quality of life of personnel, as well as projects connected with meeting international commitments. Chosen projects were co-financed with the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP). In the context of set priorities and budgetary considerations, projects dealing with energy efficiency remained in the preparatory phase. No changes occurred in the condition of central and garrison training facilities.

**Most facilities managed by the MoD are in a bad technical condition and are outmoded**

33) Budgetary constraints limited infrastructure maintenance as well. Most facilities managed by the MoD are in a bad technical condition, are outmoded and expensive to maintain. Some facilities are in a state of disrepair which limits their use and poses a danger especially to the natural environment.

## 1.9 The National Defence Support System

34) The long-term development of national defence support (infrastructure, services and activities provided for the purposes of national defence) was updated. Its development remained limited by a low level of financing, leading to the postponement of task completion and some plans not being launched. The utility of several defence infrastructure compounds remained limited by their technical condition.

35) The absence of a conceptual approach in the area of national defence support did not allow for the preparation and implementation of systemic measures to adjust it to the changed security environment, while at the same time that changed environment makes it even more important. It was decided that a NATO Force Integration Unit (NFIU) should be created on the territory of the Slovak Republic, the activities of which will also help inter alia the preparation and implementation of measures aimed at enhancing the abilities of the Slovak Republic to provide Host Nation Support (HNS) to allied forces in the event of them being stationed in or operating on its territory (including transit).

An absence of a conceptual approach in the area of national defence support

## 1.10 The Focus of Public Communication and Public Relations

36) Communication on the part of the MoD was focused on meeting international obligations and accomplishing tasks by the AF SR during non-military emergencies on Slovak territory. The involvement of the AF SR in preparing citizens for national defence was enhanced by amending legislation. However, this preparation as part of the educational process in primary and secondary schools was still focused on life and health protection in times of emergencies.

37) Initiatives of the *White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic* (2013) in communicating with non-departmental domestic target groups, including the third sector, have not materialised. This resulted in a lessened public understanding of Slovak defence needs and of some measures taken by the MoD, a largely negative attitude of the media and a similarly critical approach towards the MoD by the non-governmental expert community.

38) Communication concerning national defence lacked strategy making it underdeveloped, ineffectual and largely reactive. All this in an era when the information channels in the Slovak Republic are being filled by domestic extremist groups and foreign actors spreading their message and propaganda aimed against the security interests of the Slovak Republic.

## 1.11 Conclusions

39) The contribution of the *White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic* (2013) to providing a clear picture of the condition of national defence and a long-term politico-strategic framework of national defence development, with a focus on the AF SR, was confirmed. Its implementation was influenced primarily by the fundamental change in the security environment and such measures aimed at minimising security risks as were necessitated by this change.

In spite of progress made in solving problems arising from the AF SR transformation process, shortfalls remain

40) Although identified by the *White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic* (2013) and **in spite of progress made in solving problems arising from the AF SR transformation process, shortfalls remain**. These shortfalls, which were **impossible to correct since 2013** and have the potential of persisting in the mid-term, are primarily found in the capacities and capabilities of the AF SR, resulting from long-term budgetary restraints and ineffective resource management. These **particularly** include:

- low manning levels of the AF SR in the state of security (the “state of security” as stated in national constitutional legislation\*), particularly of units in lower readiness levels, influencing their ability to become operationally ready,
- insufficient numbers and obsolescence of equipment and other materiel, including communication and information systems, along with a lessened serviceability of some equipment,
- restrictions on the scope and quality of training, especially tactical training at the battalion and brigade levels, and also the achieved number of flight hours,
- supplies available for combat operations are at a critically low level,
- the quality of AF SR capabilities and their level of interoperability with allied forces are low.

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\* State of security - a state in which the following are maintained: peace and security of the State, its democratic system and sovereignty, its territorial integrity and inviolability of its borders, fundamental rights and freedoms. It is also a state in which the lives and wellbeing of individuals, property and the natural environment are protected.



41) This *White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic* (2016) defines the course for further ensuring national defence until 2030, closely linking this course to the measures aimed at reducing shortfalls taken in 2013-2015 and the fundamental change in the security environment.

*Helicopters of the armed forces play an irreplaceable role not only in combat operations but also in resolving non-military emergencies on Slovak territory.*



*It is necessary to create adequate conditions for service in the AF SR.*

*Soldiers today also carry out tasks far away from the Slovak Republic.*







**Our CBRN specialists are world-class.**



**Tanks still command respect on the battle-field.**



# The External Security Environment of the Slovak Republic

42) **The framework of the global security environment** is undergoing dynamic change and will continue to be characterised by geopolitical and geo-economical changes, along with new asymmetries in power and wealth distribution.

43) **The security environment of the Slovak Republic** is and will continue to be greatly influenced (positively and negatively) primarily by **globalisation and its accompanying changes in the international state of affairs**. The perpetuation of open globalisation processes will remain as one of the sources of serious **security problems** in geopolitical, geo-economical, ecological, raw material and social matters. In the long-term they **may have an unpredictable, synergic and cumulative effect**. They will continue to go hand in hand with conflicts, crises and new hotbeds of tension.

44) **Unconventional domains and spaces** (informational, electromagnetic, cybernetic, cosmic and nano-technological) **will be drawn towards the centre of gravity of military activities**, depending on the speed of technological advance of specific security actors. **Cyberspace has become a new operational domain of conducting combat activity**. An attack carried out in cyberspace may escalate **to the extent of invoking Art 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty** and may lead to collective defence, or rather a coordinated response of NATO member states. Tying into this is the fact that **the development of weapon systems for unconventional domains and spaces is not at present fully limited** by the existing system of political and legal arrangements in the area of arms control, which poses a serious security problem.

**A partial return to developing the combat potential of modern, technologically sophisticated armed forces of a conventional type**

45) In the case of some actors, **the possibility of partially returning to developing the combat potential of modern, technologically sophisticated armed forces of a conventional type** in the mid-term is likely (this concerns primarily hardware for the ground forces, the Special Operations Forces, precision weapon systems, hypersonic weapon systems, missiles with horizontal flight, means of electronic warfare, cybernetic weapons and missile defence assets). Also, one of the leading trends in combat activity is **the utilisation of unmanned aerial vehicles and electronic warfare assets**.

46) Nuclear powers will continue to **utilise the potential of strategic nuclear forces' capabilities and functions**. It is not possible to exclude the possibility of a new nuclear power emerging in the mid-term. Globally, the potential and capabilities of strategic nuclear forces will be one of the main sources of tensions.

47) The possibility of **utilising low yield nuclear munitions** at the tactical or the operational-tactical level, the ability to adjust their effects (third generation nuclear weapons), the utilisation of multiple independent re-entry vehicles and the enhanced mobility of nuclear weapon systems (including their platforms) are the **main trends in the area of the military utilisation of nuclear forces**, besides that of deterrence and containment by strategic nuclear forces (this function will probably be retained).

48) It is impossible to dismiss the likelihood that, in connection with the dynamics of change of the global security environment, it will be imperative to transform one of the pillars of international security – **the international system of arms control and disarmament**. This will primarily involve the system of treaties regarding regulations and the control of arms and disarmament in the area of conventional and unconventional weapons, cyberspace and outer space.

49) There will be attempts, in the area of arms control and disarmament, to not only bind by treaty the largest number of actors possible, but also to counter such attempts. Their essence will be the abandonment or the non-involvement of particular actors in specific areas of armament and disarmament covered by the existing system. These processes **have the potential of reactivating the spiral of an arms race of global proportions**.

50) Questions of transforming the system of arms control and disarmament is closely linked with other pillars of international security. In this context the key questions concern mainly **key subjects of international law** (for example the right of nations to self-determination vs. the territorial integrity of a state) and issues related to **justifying the very existence of systems of common defence and collective security**. The security architecture of Europe is undergoing change and revision. This is the result of the system of international law, as applied so far, being questioned, as well as of the developments taking place in bilateral relations of the Russian Federation with Ukraine on the one hand, and with NATO and the EU on the other. These aspects will, to a large extent, influence the security of the Slovak Republic.

51) How the situation in the eastern neighbourhood of NATO and the EU develops will have a **decisive impact** on the security environment of the Slovak Republic and her Allies. The current security situation in the eastern parts of Ukraine **will probably lead to an additional frozen conflict**. Its existence will create potential sources of tensions, which will also influence the security situation throughout Ukraine with a possible spill-over to the security of the Slovak Republic.

**How the situation in the eastern neighbourhood develops will have a decisive impact on the security environment of the Slovak Republic and her Allies**

52) Ukraine will probably continue in its efforts to intensify its military cooperation with NATO which is one of the deciding factors in the worsening of its relations with the Russian Federation. **A large-scale conventional armed conflict between Ukraine and the Russian Federation is unlikely, but it is not possible to dismiss this scenario completely. The security situation can change rapidly.** In the case of a larger conflict it is important to primarily keep in mind the extant problem of the internally displaced persons in Ukraine, the number of which could grow rapidly. **In the event that the security situation of Ukraine worsens further, the migration potential of Ukraine may multiply** with deleterious effects on the security architectures of neighbouring countries.

53) Ukraine will continue to be dependent on the political and financial support of the EU and the International Monetary Fund. Improvement of Ukraine's economic situation is not likely in the near to mid-term. The political situation in the country remains unstable. **The strengthening of these factors may lead to social unrest among the populace.**

54) The revised *Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation* explicitly declares its defensive character, **but the actual politics and the security realities may change.** This doctrine emphasises that nuclear weapons will be used only in reaction to an attack on the Russian Federation by nuclear or conventional means and its very existence is threatened. **A security problem in this context arises mainly from their reserving the right of a pre-emptive nuclear attack at the operational and tactical levels.**

**Strategic-level propaganda along with “hybrid means of conducting combat operations” represent a major security threat**

55) Strategic-level propaganda along with specific operational methods which are today called “hybrid means of conducting combat operations” represent a major security threat from the point of view of conducting conflicts in a changing security environment. **Propaganda at the strategic level is a part of exerting informational and psychological influence on chosen target groups of the society within the framework of the so called “information warfare”. Propaganda at the strategic level is one of the pillars of a concept called “permanent war”.** The basic tenets of this concept may be utilised in future conflicts of different types by **all manner of security actors** (also non-state), **not only by the security forces of states.** The aim is to break, with a minimal use of conventional forces, the moral and psychological strength of the adversary's armed forces and particularly of a part of his civilian population (the polarisation of target groups) in such a way as to strike at the values and assets of the opponent targeted by “hybrid warfare”.

56) **Sources of potential threats** of both a military and non-military character will continue to be caused by the **uneven economic, social and demographic development** of individual nations, states, regions and continents. In the end, differences also create favourable conditions for the activities of terrorist, radical, extremist and militant groups.

57) **Organised terrorism** will persist as a serious global **security threat of an asymmetric character**, supported also by certain authoritarian regimes. Terrorism applies and will continue to apply an indirect strategy, the essence of which is to avoid direct confrontation with states. It will aim its attacks at selected sensitive and unprepared segments of a society, for example mass gatherings of people permitting maximum effect as regards the infliction of losses and influencing the moods of a society, undermining the belief of citizens in the ability of the state to ensure their security. Even the most modern arms and weapon systems are ineffective against such attacks.

58) **New terrorist groups that are creating and will continue to create new potential areas of instability are gaining ground on the international scene.** Many of them accept the ideology of AL-QAIDA, while others, like the Islamic State are more radical than AL-QAIDA.

59) **A rise of different forms of terrorist activity** may be expected in the Horn of Africa, Sahel, Maghreb and Levant regions, along with the Persian Gulf states. This rise cannot be excluded from south-east Asia and some areas of the western and south-western Balkans.

60) The threat of terrorism **increases exponentially with technological advances.** This development may, in the end, create **new forms of individual terrorism** (for example a genetically engineered plague and computer viruses, lone wolves, individuals returning from conflict areas, migrants).

61) The **balance of power between actors** (both state and non-state) may be decisively altered by **weapons of mass destruction** arsenals in their possession and may necessitate a **change of military strategy and tactics.** The rising number of actors attempting to possess weapons of mass destruction by **achieving the technological wherewithal to produce them or simply by buying them is, along with their trafficking,** a serious security threat to global security. **The threat of misusing readily available biological substances will remain.**

62) **Future conflicts will probably not be of a large-scale character** on a large territory with massive involvement of human and material resources, but of a more **local, regional character.**

63) **The Middle East** will continue to be a **source of instability.** The main destabilising factors will be: territorial disputes, the expansion of terrorism in conjunction with religious extremism, social and economic stagnation and degradation, migration, energy shortfalls, water shortage and resulting food shortages, population growth, spread of conventional and unconventional weapons.

**The Middle East will continue to be a source of instability**

64) **In the long-term perspective, it is not possible to dismiss** the possibility of subdued military and non-military security **threats,** localised in current and potential zones of tension in the Eurasian crisis crescent to the South and East of Slovakia, **escalating into generated local conflicts of**

a **military and non-military character**. Conflicts of this kind could, under certain conditions in a radically changing security environment, escalate into regional proportions. Negative phenomena connected with migration processes pose specific security problems in the above context. One of the consequences of the worsening security situation in areas south of the Slovak Republic may be a **heightened migration wave from the southern migration route** (so called Libyan Road).

**Military and non-military, symmetric and asymmetric security threats**

65) The security environment of the Slovak Republic will in the long-term be influenced by **global military and non-military, symmetric and asymmetric security threats, such as:**

- **terrorism and organised transnational terrorism,**
- **cybernetic attacks,**
- **exertion of informational and psychological influence on the populace and hybrid warfare,**
- **use of weapons of mass destruction,**
- **illegal possession and spread of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and their manufacturing technology,**
- **rise of asymmetric conflicts (local and regional conflicts of a military or non-military character),**
- **organised transnational crime allied with illegal arms and materiel trafficking, production and sale of drugs and active participation in illegal migration,**
- **rise of religious, left-wing and right-wing extremism,**
- **uncontrollable migration,**
- **deepening of differences between poor and wealthy states and restrictions on access to natural resources, water and economic products,**
- **shrinking of strategic sources of raw materials and food,**
- **persistence of the current crisis, or the crisis of the financial, or perhaps of the monetary and economic systems.**

66) The external security environment of the Slovak Republic will be **specifically influenced more by non-military and asymmetric threats** than those of a military and symmetric character. In the long-term perspective we may assume **these will increase, their spectrum will broaden and their destructive power will be enhanced**. It is impossible to dismiss the scenario that some of them may progressively escalate into threats of a military character.





*Air policing and air defence are among the most important tasks of the AF SR.*



*Land Forces comprise the largest element of the AF SR.*



*The fire support by modern artillery is crucial for gaining superiority on the modern battle-field.*





*Rescuing a casualty of a natural disaster.*



*Soldiers on missions and operations abroad also contribute to the security of the Slovak Republic.*

# The Future Defence Efforts of the Slovak Republic

*Defence efforts of the Slovak Republic express the will and clear determination of the State to maintain its defences. They reaffirm the guarantees to the citizens of the Slovak Republic that national defence will be assured and they express the guarantee to its Allies that the Slovak Republic will honour its commitments. At the same time, it is a message to potential adversaries about the credibility of the Slovak Republic in ensuring national defence.*

*The scope and character of defence efforts is determined by security interests, aims and tasks of Slovak defence policy as stated in strategies, by legislation, international commitments and by related political decisions of decision-makers. These, in reaction to the scope and character of threats posed to the Slovak Republic and her Allies, determine the specific aims and measures of national defence, including the appropriate level of national resources allocated to national defence and the ways in which they are spent.*

## 3.1 The Basis of Defence Efforts

67) The core of the defence efforts of the Slovak Republic will be to ensure **national defence** as a basic condition of national existence and the security of its citizens, by means of national defence capacities, collective defence through NATO and tools provided by the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU. National defence, including the strengthening of its defence capacities, are among the priorities of the Government.

Consistently meet the national responsibility for defence

68) The defence efforts of the Slovak Republic will be based on **the national responsibility for defence** as enshrined in the constitutional framework of the Slovak Republic. It states that „the defence of the Slovak Republic is a duty and a question of honour of citizens”, while „the Government of the Slovak Republic is responsible for national defence and security“. The Slovak Republic will **enhance its ability to defend itself by developing its individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack**, which will also strengthen the defence potential of NATO and the military capabilities of the EU.



69) The defence efforts of the Slovak Republic reflect the long-term needs of national defence, which go beyond the term of a single Government. **The continuity** of dealing with key issues of national defence will be achieved on the basis of a broad political agreement of the most influential political parties.

70) **The scope of the defence efforts is tied in with the level and stability of defence spending and also the degree to which the security interests of the Slovak Republic are threatened.** Defence spending may be partially negatively influenced, but not determined, either by external pressures (economic crisis), or by internal factors (change of Government).

71) **Defence efforts will be realised primarily as part of the development of the system of national defence,** itself being part of the system of national security. The system of national defence will be able to take into account a wide spectrum of threats and scenarios of how they may unfold, ranging from terrorist threats to an armed attack by military means combining various tools and methods within the format of sophisticated forms of conducting combat operations utilising both standard and high-end technologies.

## 3.2 Slovak Defence Efforts in the Future Security Environment

72) The expected development of the security environment demands that the defence efforts be geared towards **enhancing preparedness of the Slovak Republic** for national defence as part of decreasing its vulnerability and strengthening its overall resilience. In this context, **the comprehensive approach to national defence will also be enhanced,** which will entail *inter alia* a more effective utilisation of the potential of the Slovak defence industry.

The defence efforts will be geared towards enhancing the preparedness of the Slovak Republic for national defence

73) Due to the global or transnational character of most threats along with the limitations of national defence capacities, **the Slovak Republic will approach most threats and challenges on the basis of a joint effort with Allies and partners within international organisations, mainly NATO and the EU.** Similarly, the Slovak Republic will provide aid to Allies and partners within the above mentioned international organisations. Slovakia will support the internal cohesion and functionality of NATO and the EU, as well as their ability to act and complement each other as regards tools and activities.

74) Contractual guarantees of collective defence and mutual assistance within international organisations do not exempt Slovakia from **meeting its natural responsibility of providing for its own defence by means of its national defence capacities,** as stated in its constitutional and legal

frameworks. This is also confirmed by Art. 3 of the *North Atlantic Treaty*, in accordance with which the Parties, **separately and jointly**, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, **will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.**

**Maintain the ability to generate defence capacities for the most dire threat scenario – an armed attack**

75) To responsibly approach national defence, it is required that **adequate defence capacities to solve most probable threat scenarios to the Slovak Republic are continuously maintained, along with the ability to timely generate defence capacities able to confront even the most dire threat scenario – an armed attack against the Slovak Republic.**

76) In line with its security interests, Slovakia will push for **strengthening collective defence and deterrence** as part of NATO's **long term adaptation** to the fundamentally changed security environment. To this end, Slovakia's defence efforts will primarily contribute by AF SR capability development, taking part in joint rapid reaction forces and by maintaining a high level of preparedness of the HNS. Slovakia will also contribute its Armed Forces to NATO-led **missions and operations** abroad. As part of fulfilling NATO's **cooperative security** task, Slovakia will coordinate with Allies its efforts to boost arms control and disarmament, military transparency and confidence building measures. It will also support the transformation of the armed forces of candidate and partner nations including their training and also to support the development of NATO's partnerships, with an accent on its strategic partnership with the EU.

77) Slovakia will contribute to the effectiveness and credibility of the **Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU**, which also includes contributing forces and AF SR resources to EU military missions and operations, as well as to EU rapid reaction forces. In order to support the development of EU partnerships with other international organisations and states, Slovakia may provide a military contribution in the area of defence capacity building of partners. At the same time, Slovakia will support the effective **cooperation of EU member states in military capability development**, especially as regards high-end capabilities.

78) In accordance with its security and foreign policy aims, as well as international law, Slovakia will involve itself in UN missions.

79) Slovakia will participate in **international defence cooperation within NATO and the EU primarily with the other Visegrad Group countries**, with an aim to effectively mitigate capability shortfalls. This especially concerns intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, cyber defence, air policing cooperation, strategic transport, training, multinational logistical support and other capabilities. Slovakia will maintain not only its leading role in the NATO Explosive Ordnance Disposal Centre of Excellence based on its territory, but also its partnership with Poland in leading the NATO Counter-Intelligence Centre of Excellence based Poland.

80) In keeping with its defence efforts, Slovakia is **resolved to employ its Armed Forces in national defence** based on the natural right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the *UN Charter* and principles of international law, in keeping with its international commitments stemming from the collective defence against armed attack treaty, the EU treaties and other international commitments.

81) **The AF SR must ready themselves to act in accordance with the politico-military ambition of the Slovak Republic** in a fundamentally changed security environment, entailing a change of the anticipated operational theatre of their future deployment, as well as the character of conducting combat operations against different types of adversaries.

82) **The operational theatre of future AF SR deployment and employment** will be differentiated geographically, environmentally, politically, economically and culturally, while it may be characterised by rapid and intensive military activity, high manoeuvrability of groups involved, employment of traditional land, air and SOF capabilities with an emphasis placed on their integrated and simultaneous deployment, conducting of cybernetic and electronic warfare and the presence of high-end technologies, including anti-access and area denial assets, unmanned aerial vehicles, precision munitions and other (also standard) technologies. The AF SR may also be employed in an operational theatre where no clear lines exist either between the battle front and rear, or between combatants and civilians. The AF SR may be called upon to take action against an adversary fighting a conventional war, or a mixed conventional and unconventional (asymmetrical) war in either different stages of a conflict or simultaneously (hybrid conflict) on open ground, but also in cities, which may also involve paramilitary forces. The AF SR may, however, also face an adversary that employs exclusively irregular, asymmetrical tactics (long-term insurgency activity) mainly in an urban environment.

83) **In the event of defending the Slovak Republic**, militarily favourable conditions at the strategic, operational and tactical levels will be created, based on prepared national capacities for AF SR support, primarily for a rapid operational deployment and the effective operation of the AF SR. During defensive operations on the territory of the Slovak Republic, other elements of the system of national defence along with the mobilisation of human and material capacities of the nation will support the AF SR, while HNS will be provided for.

84) In the context of growing regional instability generating greater threats to NATO member states, **the territories of these states** will be considered the **top priority** as regards the **operational theatre of future AF SR deployment abroad** (collective defence). It is expected that whilst operating on the territory of an Ally, HNS capacities of that Ally will be taken advantage of by the AF SR.

**The collectively defended territories of NATO states will be considered the top priority as regards the operational theatre of future AF SR deployment abroad**



85) The AF SR may also be deployed abroad **in a region more or less distant from the Euro-Atlantic area**, especially as part of missions and operations of international organisations to bolster international peace and security. This may concern a culturally alien environment with underdeveloped infrastructure, very limited or non-existent public services and non-functioning administration, requiring comprehensive support of units from home.

86) **In addition to its main task**, which is national defence, the AF SR must be prepared to **effectively respond to non-military threats** on the territory of the Slovak Republic. During certain types of non-military emergencies, those AF SR units possessing life, health and property protection capabilities will also be employed in conjunction with other elements of the system of national security. AF SR capabilities can also be utilised in counter-terrorist operations and to provide support in maintaining public order.

87) **It is apparent that both the territory of the Slovak Republic and that of her Allies represents a qualitatively different operational theatre** of AF SR deployment, anticipates a different adversary and a **different conduct of combat operations** in contrast to past AF SR employment in peace, stabilisation and reconstruction missions in regions more or less distant from the Euro-Atlantic area. This requires placing emphasis on developing those AF SR capabilities that can be utilised in defence of the Slovak Republic and her Allies.

### 3.3 The Politico-Military Ambition

The new scope of the national politico-military ambition must, in a comprehensive manner, express the end-state of AF SR capacities and capabilities for operational employment

88) The politico-military ambition of the Slovak Republic expresses the scope and purpose of AF SR employment.<sup>3</sup> The scope of the national politico-military ambition must in a comprehensive manner express the end-state of AF SR capacities and capabilities (in the context of NATO Capability Targets for Slovakia), which will be employed in:

- **the defence of the Slovak Republic,**
- **meeting commitments of the Slovak Republic stemming from the treaty on collective defence against attack (collective defence of a NATO Ally),**
- **missions and operations abroad,**
- **non-military emergencies on the territory of the Slovak Republic.**

89) A comprehensive politico-military ambition will more precisely express national defence as a priority of Slovak defence efforts. It will also reaffirm the quality, scope and level of operational readiness of Slovakia's contribution to NATO meeting its Level of Ambition, along with its contribution to

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<sup>3</sup>) Article 27 of the *Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic* (2005).

missions and operations conducted as part of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy. It will also take into account the mission of the AF SR as regards non-military emergencies on the territory of the Slovak Republic.

90) The politico-military ambition of the Slovak Republic will take into account:

- the anticipated evolution of the security environment, including threats and challenges,
- the primarily national responsibility for the defence of the Slovak Republic,
- the comprehensive approach to national defence,
- increasing qualitative demands on the system of national defence,
- commitments within NATO,
- tasks in the area of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy,
- other international commitments of the Slovak Republic,
- the AF SR mission in case of non-military emergencies on the territory of the Slovak Republic.

91) Fulfilling the politico-military ambition will be provided for as a key priority of national defence. Tasks primarily connected with defending the Slovak Republic and meeting her commitments stemming from the treaty on collective defence against armed attack will be paramount. These are tasks that require a **continuously high level of readiness** and war-fighting ability of the AF SR, while in the case of capability shortfalls connected with these tasks, an acute **risk** arises that national defence may not be fully provided for. The tasks in question are:

- defence and protection of national air space within the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System ("NATINAMDS"),
- maintaining critical capabilities necessary for national defence and their systematic build-up with an emphasis on the capabilities of a mechanised brigade and forces also employable in counter-terrorist operations,
- maintaining a high-readiness mechanised battalion group and contributing to NATO and EU rapid reaction forces,
- provide for mobilisation and HNS.

92) The politico-military ambition of the Slovak Republic will be defined in a comprehensive manner in the new *Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic*, tying in with the *Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic*, both of which must be approved by the National Council of the Slovak Republic.

## 3.4 Planning Assumptions for Ensuring National Defence

93) The fundamental change of the security environment in Europe and the worsening of the security situation in her neighbourhood **require an increased ability of the Slovak Republic to defend itself. The basic planning assumption** necessary for achieving future AF SR capabilities is the politico-military ambition of the Slovak Republic, in accordance with which and depending on the situation, Slovak authorities may decide on employing the AF SR on the following scales:

- in operations in defence of the Slovak Republic – full scale of capacity,
- in collective defence operations in defence of an Ally in case of armed attack – on a scale consistent with international commitments,
- in non-article 5 NATO led operations, and also missions and operations of the EU and the UN - on a scale declared by the Slovak Republic,
- in case of non-military emergencies on the territory of the Slovak Republic - on an adequate scale.

To these ends the AF SR will be divided according to readiness levels.

**In order to enhance the ability of the Slovak Republic to defend itself it is imperative to provide adequate defence spending**

94) In order to enhance the ability of the Slovak Republic to defend itself **it is imperative to provide adequate defence spending** primarily focused on investing in major military equipment and in training. These are the basic conditions that must be met in order to increase the quality of AF SR capabilities, their war-fighting potential and their overall level of readiness for national defence.

95) While respecting the important principle of fair burden sharing of **NATO efforts**, including contributing to threat prevention and ensuring security, the key indicator of which is the level of defence spending, **Slovakia will increase its share** of this common effort in the context of the evolution of the security environment and the possibilities of its national economy.

96) Slovakia reaffirms its political commitment to the *Defence Investment Pledge* (2014) agreed upon by NATO member states and accepted in the *NATO Political Guidance* (2015). This commitment binds Slovakia to halt any decline in defence spending and aim to increase defence spending in real terms as GDP grows and also to aim, within a decade, to move towards the 2% of GDP guideline level of defence spending. This commitment also entails the aim to increase, within a decade, the annual investment in major new equipment, including related research and development expenditure (equipment expenditure) to 20% or more of total defence spending.

97) Slovak defence spending will **increase in both real terms and as a percentage of GDP** according to the needs of the defence the Slovak Republic and allied commitments. This increase will be determined by the state of

public finances and the **ambition** to achieve the level of 1.6% of GDP on defence in 2020, while aiming for 2% of GDP in the long-term. **Equipment expenditure** will adapt to the NATO criterion of spending a **minimum of 20%** of defence spending to gradually overcome long-term shortfalls in the area of AF SR equipment and other materiel, including communication and information systems.

**Slovak defence spending will increase according to the needs of the defence of the Slovak Republic and allied commitments**

98) **An increase in defence spending will be achieved mainly by Government investment in financially demanding strategic modernisation projects, which will be approved and financed individually.**

99) The development of national defence capacities (mainly AF SR capabilities) will require, in the area of defence spending:

- **a realistic and binding** annual budget,
- a multiannual **stability** of budgetary cycles,
- **long term predictability** of planning assumptions,
- **a gradual growth** in line with the objective needs of the defence of the Slovak Republic along with commitments to Allies.

100) **Predictability of defence spending** is a key precondition of their effective allocation. It allows for a purposeful systematic development of national defence capacities in tandem with the Slovak defence industry, as well as an effective involvement of Slovakia in multiannual bilateral and multinational development projects and initiatives.

101) Effort will be made to gradually increase Slovak defence spending and by its effective allocation **achieve:**

- **in the mid-term** (by the end of 2020) a **better balance between national defence tasks and resources**, including the execution of priority armament projects,
- **in the long-term** (by the end of 2030) a **marked reduction in long-term development shortfalls** in the AF SR by the execution of most large (strategic), financially demanding armament projects,
- **full equilibrium between national defence tasks and allocated resources, assuming national defence spending will approach 2% of GDP** in line with the long-term national ambition and commitments within NATO.

102) When taking decisions to employ the AF SR abroad as part of NATO and EU rapid reaction forces or other unbudgeted missions and operations, the preference will be for such financing that will neither deprive other activities, nor the development of the AF SR. The Slovak Government will be presented with a declaration of AF SR units and assets provided to NATO and EU rapid reaction forces, the employment of which (to complete tasks abroad) will require a speedy release of funds for this purpose in excess of the MoD budget.

103) The MoD will **take measures ensuring the purposeful, efficient and transparent allocation of resources**, in particular:

- enhance defence planning system at the MoD and the national level and harmonise it with NATO defence planning processes and EU military capability development procedures,
- optimise the administrative structure and evaluate the effectiveness of internal processes,
- systematically implement risk management at the MoD,
- increase the use of information technologies and electronic means used in state administration, including the use of electronic auctions,
- streamline management of AF SR stocks,
- measures in the area of energy efficiency of buildings,
- cooperation at the inter-ministerial and international level in the area of preparation of personnel and armament,
- a purposeful utilisation of resources from abroad, especially within NATO and the EU.

Financial resources gained in this manner will be used first and foremost to improve the AF SR.

104) In line with the constitutional authority and the principal of civilian management and democratic oversight of armed forces, their tasks, the financing of national defence and the level of defence capacities are determined by democratically elected state authorities. Inevitably a **risk to national defence will arise if the Slovak Republic will not have the capacities and capabilities to fully cover all threats in line with her politico-military ambition.**

## 3.5 Defence Planning

105) Defence planning integrating an entire spectrum of planning domains (forces planning, resource planning, armament planning, logistics planning etc.) will be the **deciding tool** of Government **in creating and maintaining defence capacities**. This will include a balanced approach and the effective allocation of resources to ensure required AF SR capacities and capabilities, along with national defence support, in line with the needs of the defence of the Slovak Republic and international commitments of Slovakia.

### An improvement of the defence planning system

106) In order to achieve development aims effectively, a key precondition must be the improvement of the defence planning system, tying in **strategic aims, mid-term programming priorities and the budget with the procurement process**, while ensuring harmony between individual planning domains.

107) By improving the **defence planning system**, support will be given to a more effective allocation of resources and to their more efficient and more purposeful utilisation in order to complete tasks and improve the AF SR. At the same time, the **MoD will reinforce its ability and effectiveness in**



**fulfilling its coordination function** in the defence planning process. Stable and transparent defence planning will allow for the involvement of the Slovak defence industry in developing and obtaining equipment and other materiel for the AF SR.

108) As the main product of defence planning at the MoD are battle-worthy AF SR, all internal distribution of funds will be subordinated to this aim. Regularly, there will be a procurement plan released, based on long and mid-term plans. Emphasis will be placed on a clear statement of requirements of the AF SR as part of improving the defence planning system.

109) Improvement of the **defence planning system** will primarily lead to:

- **a deeper and better quality of partial outputs, as well as the quality of overall results of defence planning** by tying in strategic aims and tasks with their resource backing and with procurement processes, including a joint review and balancing of planned tasks and real resources by responsible authorities of the MoD and the AF SR General Staff, while **enhancing transparency**,
- **the rationalisation of defence planning** by simplifying its fundamental processes and by clearly defining functional responsibility and tasks of sponsors and co-sponsors in all phases,
- **the integrated involvement of individual levels of defence management and the command structure** in defence planning processes, in order to allow necessary choices to be made about resource utilisation, especially in the context of the current condition of defence capacities and resource possibilities,
- **enhancing the flexibility of the system of continuous and cyclical review** of achieved results, including necessary timely systemic and practical corrections while tasks and conditions are changing (especially those concerning resources), while at the same time a more transparent allocation and retroactive monitoring of effectiveness of resource utilisation, in line with approved plans emphasising planned development priorities will be better arranged,
- **the harmonisation of content and processes of the defence planning of the Slovak Republic with the NATO Defence Planning Process**, emphasising the building and development of required capabilities, the identification of minimal capability requirements, reception and implementation of NATO Capability Targets for Slovakia as well as the NATO Defence Planning Capability Review, including the appointment of direct responsibility for specific inputs and outputs. In the end, this will improve the conditions for harmonising AF SR development plans primarily with partners in the Visegrad group.

110) The key precondition of improving the defence planning system will be the **professional training of respective personnel and responsible authorities**, including the long-term continuity of expertise of those authorities in the area of defence planning.



*An informal meeting of defence ministers during Slovakia's presidency in the Council of the EU in 2016 with Federica Mogherini and Jens Stoltenberg.*



*The President of the Slovak Republic and the Commander-in-Chief of the AF SR while visiting soldiers in Trenčín.*



*Training with an Mi-17 helicopter.*





# Defence Management

*The aim of defence management is to continuously maintain and develop the capacity of the Slovak Republic to resist armed attack and effectively manage national defence while effectively utilising national defence capacities.*

## 4.1 Defining Defence Management

111) **National defence management** (carried out in line with the constitutional and legal authority of constitutional bodies, the operation of ministries, other central state administrative bodies and state administrative bodies with a national scope of authority) is a **continuous activity** aimed at **preparing and taking measures concerning national defence**, as well as **organising defence** against armed attack. This mainly includes the evaluation of threats and risks involving national defence, decision-making concerning national defence; planning, organising, coordinating, control and evaluation of implementation of these decisions, as well as verifying the readiness of respective authorities to complete tasks in war-time.

112) Within the scope of their constitutional and legal authority, the National Council of the Slovak Republic and the President of the Slovak Republic decide on measures concerning national defence. The Government is responsible for national security and defence. The MoD is the central state administrative body in charge of defence management.

113) **Defence management is carried out as part of the system of national defence**, which is a complex of entities and measures and their interconnectedness by means of which the National Council of the Slovak Republic, the Government, ministries, central state administrative bodies, other state administrative bodies with a national scope of authority, local administration bodies, municipalities and self-governing regions provide for the preparation, administration and completion of national defence tasks. Courts, the Attorney General, other legal entities, physical entities with the right to run a business and physical entities provide for the preparation and completion of national defence tasks.



## 4.2 Requirements for Improving the System of National Defence

114) In light of the dynamically changing security environment, as well as the character of threats and challenges, the state of alert and readiness of forces and means of reaction will be reviewed. Preparedness of the Slovak Republic for defence will be founded and improved on in the state of security, involving an entire spectrum of activities. Key will be to improve national defence management, which will require **the improvement of intelligence, the early warning system and situational awareness** with the aim of a timely identification of arising threats and a correct understanding of the complex relationship between cause and effect of security threats.

115) **Improving the decision-making processes** of constitutional and state administrative bodies in the area of defence, in the state of security as well as in war-time, will be the basic precondition of improving national defence management. This **increases the demands placed on the effectiveness of analytical, decision-making, coordinating, inspectional and supporting activities of all entities responsible for national defence.**

116) Ministries and other relevant state administrative bodies within the scope of their responsibilities, along with specialised entities created in order to evaluate risks and threats concerning national defence, will provide relevant constitutional and state administrative bodies with **timely, qualified and trustworthy information concerning the rise of potential threats, their risks and possible consequences**, along with recommendations of how to prevent or resolve them, and how to mitigate their effects.

117) In order to improve national defence management, **comprehensive planning of national defence** will be introduced. This will entail defence planning, planning of AF SR employment for the purposes of national defence, AF SR mobilisation planning and economic mobilisation planning for the purposes of national defence. To coordinate the above planning activities, the MoD will prepare guidelines for the planning of national defence, which will primarily establish the organisation of its preparation, the complex of planning documents and the manner of its alinement.

118) The centre of gravity of the improvement of **managing the preparation for national defence** will be primarily focused on the preparation, maintenance and development of national defence capacities, on augmenting AF SR capacities, on preparing ministries and other central state administrative bodies, other state administrative bodies with a national scope of authority, local state administrative and municipality bodies for national defence (and for the verification of their readiness to complete tasks in war-time) and also on preparing the populace for national defence.

The improvement of intelligence and decision-making processes, and the introduction of comprehensive planning of national defence

119) The centre of gravity of the improvement of **defence management in war-time** will focus on enhancing the ability of respective state administrative bodies to organise defence by systemically increasing and effectively utilising defence capacities, together with utilising planned collective capacities and capabilities to resist armed attack. Measures of national defence management in war-time will be drafted in detail by the MoD in appropriate plans.

120) In order to improve our national defence management, measures will be taken to **deepen the functional harmonisation and synchronisation of our national crisis response system with the NATO Crisis Response System**, including the improvement of the technical infrastructure used for transmitting classified information. Processes of preparing and making decisions by constitutional bodies concerning the transit and the presence of allied forces on the territory of the Slovak Republic and also processes concerning the sending of the AF SR abroad will be analysed in the context of both the changed security environment and the decision-making processes of international organisations of which Slovakia is a member, and if necessary, proposals improving these processes will be drafted.

121) **Key measures for improving national defence management will be provided for as part of a comprehensive improvement of the system of national defence within the system of national security.** This will facilitate a coordinated and effective functioning of public authority bodies in the process of governing the state in all crisis situations (both military and non-military).

122) Basic measures to improve the system of national defence will be defined by the new *Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic* stemming from the *Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic*. Comprehensive measures to improve the system of national defence will be elaborated in the *System of National Defence Development Concept*. Tying into the conceptual framework, **the improvement of the legal framework** of national defence will continue.

123) **Evaluation will also be part of improving our national defence management.** It will be focused on achieving set aims while effectively utilising resources. Whether long-term aims and plans are being met will be reviewed by the Strategic Defence Review Process initiated whenever a fundamental change takes place in the political, security and resource conditions of national defence, or whenever required. Its basic output is the *White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic*. Whether aims and tasks are being achieved will be continuously evaluated by the annual comprehensive assessment of the defence of the Slovak Republic.

## 4.3 Requirements for Improving and Optimising MoD Activities

124) Enhancing the MoD's ability to continually perform tasks of a central state administrative body responsible for national defence management and AF SR development, while more effectively utilising tools of strategic management to achieve set aims, will be a fundamental requirement.

125) The ability of the MoD to perform its tasks not only in the preparatory phase but also when **organising defence in war-time**, will be a basic **criterion** of improving the quality and efficiency of the operation of the MoD. Organisational and material conditions will be provided for the MoD's operation at a back-up location for the purposes of enhancing the resilience and continuous operation of the MoD in war-time.

126) When the need to amend or widen the authority of the MoD is identified, especially in the area of improving the preparation and coordination activities of other ministries, other central state administrative bodies, other state administrative bodies with a national scope of authority in relation to national defence, appropriate adjustments to relevant legislation will be drafted.

127) The operation of the administrative structure of the MoD will be analysed from the point of view of processes, authority and activities and with an emphasis on its ability to prepare, manage and provide for national defence. **Strategic, conceptual, planning, legislative, decision-making, evaluating and inspectional activities ensuring defence will be strengthened** on the basis of this analysis. Clear and specific delegation of authority and the specific responsibility of particular MoD elements will achieve their rationalisation, interlacing of functional areas and a higher level of efficiency.

128) The MoD will formulate policy, strategies, concepts, legislation and manage funds in order to ensure national defence, including the meeting of international obligations. The AF SR General Staff will be responsible for their implementation at the AF SR and also for the expert, organisational and technical support of the AF SR command structure. The efficiency of AF SR management and command structure will be determined by the functional interconnectedness of the MoD and the General Staff, the level of mutual communication and the synergy of efforts in working towards common aims.

129) As the MoD is responsible for the preparation and management of the AF SR mobilisation, **it will conceptually elaborate the process of integrating the standing AF SR with the mobilised elements after a partial**

The MoD's ability to continually perform the tasks of a central state administrative body responsible for national defence management



or a general mobilisation, especially in connection with realities resulting from the AF SR employment plan in war-time. Ways of augmenting units in relation to the actions of local state authorities undertaken in the area of AF SR mobilisation will be elaborated.

130) The MoD will reinforce within the scope of its activities their **strategic dimension by, among others, the defence planning framework through drafting long and mid-term plans** with an emphasis on providing equipment and other materiel, including communication and information systems.

## 4.4 MoD Ancillary Elements

The capabilities of Military Intelligence to timely and continuously identify threats will be enhanced

131) *Military Intelligence* with a structure and responsibilities in line with legislation, will be a special service for the support of national defence processes. Improvement of its operation and oversight mechanisms will be dealt with in the context of overall changes in the operation and organisation of national intelligence services. Its capabilities of timely and continuous identification of threats will be enhanced. Because of increasing threats and attacks on critical infrastructure through cyberspace, Military Intelligence will develop its capabilities in the area of cyber security. Emphasis will be placed on ensuring the protection of the communication and information technology infrastructure of the MoD and on ensuring support for the AF SR in this domain.

132) Fulfilling specific functions connected with police protection, the *Military Police*, within the scope of MoD authority stipulated in the Legal Act number 124/1992 of the Collection of Laws on Military Police, will continue to be primarily an auxiliary element in relation to AF SR operations. Capabilities of the Military Police will be developed so that it may fulfil a specific police function at the MoD, as well as to operate in order to ensure AF SR activities stemming from the AF SR Legal Act and international commitments, including counter-terrorist operations.

133) Elements, which provide auxiliary and other services for the MoD and the AF SR are also part of the MoD. These are offices and facilities managed by the MoD, budgetary and semi-budgetary organisations, as well as joint stock companies with state shares managed by the MoD and also a state-owned company managed by the MoD. Tying into the long-term AF SR development plan and the optimisation of AF SR structures, the offices and facilities managed by the MoD, budgetary and semi-budgetary organisations will undergo a process of evaluation and harmonisation with the needs of national defence, while a continuous evaluation of effectiveness and the optimisation of their operations will become the norm.

134) The *Military Technical and Testing Institute - Záhorie* budgetary organisation, as the research and development facility of the MoD will

manage the research, development and testing of arms, explosives, munitions, equipment and materiel used by the AF SR.

135) The *Defence Standardisation, Codification and Quality Assurance Bureau* budgetary organisation, as a state administration body in the area of defence standardisation, codification and state quality control will fulfil its function according to the Legal Act number 11/2004 of the Collection of Laws on Defence Standardisation, Codification and State Quality Assurance of Products and Services for National Defence. At the same time it will continue the cooperation with appropriate NATO bodies, NATO member states and other states in the area of standardisation, codification and state quality control.

136) The *Training Centre - Lešt'* budgetary organisation will continue developing its potential with an emphasis on broadening its capacities for AF SR needs, security and rescue services of the Slovak Republic, as well as foreign partners.

137) The *Military Sports Centre - Dukla Banská Bystrica* budgetary organisation will provide for the preparation of athletes in individual sport disciplines in order to represent both the AF SR and the Slovak Republic. With the aim of efficiently utilising its specific know-how and experience of sports branches related to martial or military activity (martial arts, shooting sports), as well as in the interest of an overall improvement of the physical condition of soldiers, the centre will closely cooperate with the AF SR.

138) The *Military History Institute* budgetary organisation will continue to fulfil its expert function concerning military history, military museums, archives, overall care for national cultural monuments, cultural monuments overseen by the Institute, as well as the digitalisation of the archive fund and collection items.

139) The *Ordinariate of the Armed Forces and Armed Corps of the Slovak Republic* budgetary organisation will provide spiritual services to catholic worshippers in the AF SR, armed corps and rescue services (fire department, mountain rescue), along with their family members, and also provide spiritual services to incarcerated persons. The *Centre of Ecumenical Pastoral Services in the Armed Forces and Armed Corps of the Slovak Republic* budgetary organisation will manage the organisational and expert aspects of the ecumenical pastoral service in the AF SR and armed corps of the Slovak Republic, and will also extend pastoral care to worshippers of registered churches and religious societies. Both budgetary organisations will contribute, within the scope of their authority, to higher moral qualities of military personnel.

140) The *AF SR Academy of Milan Rastislav Štefánik* budgetary organisation will provide university-level education to future AF SR officers and will also provide for a continuous career and vocational training of professional soldiers, while its military character will be strengthened in order to ensure

the long-term development of university-level education and vocational training and exercises in line with AF SR requirements, including the training of professional soldiers in the area of cyber security. In the interest of maintaining and developing capabilities, it will continue to augment and rejuvenate its academic staff with professional soldiers. The Academy will support the two-way mobility of academic staff and cadets, especially within the EU. It will continue to carry out research and development as a sponsor of military science development in Slovakia. It will also provide education to the civilian personnel of the MoD and other bodies of public administration, which will be focused on matters of national security and defence.

141) The *Military Office of Social Welfare* budgetary organisation will carry out tasks connected with providing sick-pay, injury claims, retirement pensions and social welfare services in line with the Legal Act number 328/2002 of the Collection of Laws on Social Welfare of Law Enforcement Officers and Soldiers. The optimisation of its operation will be aided by a greater use of communication and information technologies.

142) Semi-budgetary organisations:

- The *Housing Agency of the MoD* will, at the latest, be abolished after disposing of all housing under its supervision.
- The *Central Military Hospital - Ružomberok – Teaching Hospital* will provide medical care and will carry out tasks connected with the medical support of national defence.

143) The process of rationalisation and streamlining of operations according to the needs of national defence will continue in the joint stock companies the *Aircraft Repair Company Trenčín JSC* (a defence industry company) and *HOREZZA JSC* (a recreation services company) managed by the MoD.<sup>4</sup> In the above mentioned defence industry companies, emphasis will be placed on the utilisation of their production, repair, construction, development and testing capacities for the benefit of the AF SR.

144) The state-owned enterprise *Military Forests and Estates of the Slovak Republic* will carry out activities leading to an efficient and ecological management of forest and agricultural land in military districts and in military forests. Measures will be taken to improve the efficiency of its operations.

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<sup>4</sup>) The MoD has a 50% share in the *St. Michael's Hospital JSC*.





*While conducting air policing the fighters also fulfil international obligations within NATINAMDS.*



*Soldiers are also being prepared for urban warfare.*





The role of the 9K38 Iгла mobile anti-aircraft rocket system is to destroy low-flying targets.



A T-72 Tank.



Exercises maintain the capabilities of units.



Special Operations Forces training.



# Armed Forces Development

*The AF SR are a pillar of statehood and are a decisive tool of the system of national defence.*

*The aim of AF SR development are modern, operationally ready and credible armed forces, possessing an adequate war-fighting potential, capable of ensuring the defence of the Slovak Republic, taking part in collective defence of Allies and contributing to conflict resolution in missions and operations abroad. The AF SR will be able to decisively, actively and effectively carry out appointed tasks concerning the defence, protection, support, maintaining and promoting the security interests of the Slovak Republic.*

145) In line with the *Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic* a *Military Strategy of the Slovak Republic* will be drafted in order to aid the achievement of this aim. This Military Strategy will elaborate the military aspects of ensuring national defence in the Defence Strategy and will direct further AF SR transformation.

**AF SR transformation will be focused primarily on increasing the quality of their capabilities**

146) AF SR transformation will be focused primarily on increasing the quality of their capabilities and critical capacities, largely by continuing the purposeful rearmament of tactical units and by outfitting them with equipment and other materiel, including communication and information systems with an emphasis on command and control. **Enhanced combat capabilities of the AF SR will be the main measurable criterion of the success of their transformation.**

147) At the same time, the necessary reorganisation of the Armed Forces will continue as part of their transformation. All tactical units will be structured according to: NATO standards in line with the needs of defending the Slovak Republic, experiences gained on missions and operations abroad, as well as NATO requirements in the context of NATO Capability Targets for Slovakia.

148) The main effort of AF SR development until 2018 will be focused on achieving the aim of the full operational capability of a mechanised brigade. The capacity and effectiveness of combat, combat support and combat service support units will be enhanced. Conditions will be created for carrying out mobilisation tasks by AF SR units and the storage of materiel

for units formed in war-time and supplies needed to ensure their war-fighting ability. Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) units will be strengthened. By continuing the development of the ISTAR battalion, the required increase in intelligence and reconnaissance capacities at the tactical level will be achieved.

149) SOF and other forces and capabilities, including those employable in counter-terrorist, counter-hybrid and counter-cyber threats operations will be strengthened.

150) The ability of the AF SR to take part in disaster relief operations in the wake of natural and industrial disasters on the territory of the Slovak Republic will be enhanced, especially by intensifying joint preparations with the elements of the Integrated Rescue System.

## 5.1 The Required Force and Capability Structures of the Future Armed Forces

151) To carry out their tasks stemming from both national legislation and the international commitments of the Slovak Republic, the AF SR must have the capacities to cover the generation, preparation, deployment, maintenance and regeneration of capabilities in order to ensure:

- individually or collectively the defence of the Slovak Republic with the aid of other elements of the system of national defence,
- the formation and preparation of reserves and the mobilisation of the AF SR,
- stocks of materiel for AF SR mobilisation, as well as compounds and infrastructure to accommodate reserves and their training,
- command and control, the build-up and maintenance of command posts, including their defence and protection,
- continuous protection and defence of the air space of the Slovak Republic within NATINAMDS,
- the contribution of a mechanised brigade for collective defence,
- other capabilities necessary for meeting the international obligations of Slovakia,
- contributions to missions and operations abroad,
- military capabilities to carry out tasks in non-military emergencies on the territory of the Slovak Republic,
- continuous monitoring of the security situation in order to identify emerging threats in a timely fashion,
- protection and defence of information systems within the scope of the MoD against cyber-attack,
- completion of tasks in the area of HNS.

152) The analysis of AF SR tasks stemming from national legislation, international commitments and Government decisions resulted in the defining of essential capacities and capabilities necessary for the long-term performance of these tasks. The set of these essential capacities and capabilities form the so called **basic AF SR model** (further on referred to just as the “Basic Model”), the core of which are 6 brigades, including C2 arrangements, combat support and combat service support elements.


153) Maintaining the AF SR at the level of the Basic Model in the state of security is not financially sustainable in the long-term. In the state of security the AF SR will be maintained so as to ensure minimal military capacity and capability requirements enabling the AF SR to perform their tasks and to meet international obligations of the Slovak Republic, while at the same time to possess capabilities enabling AF SR mobilisation.

154) AF SR units will be maintained at required levels of readiness according to their tasks, to which end a system of multi-annual cyclic tasking of units (the lifecycle of units) will be applied. Units will pass in regular cycles the stages of preparation, an assigned level of readiness, employment and regeneration. The lifecycle of AF SR units will be adjusted in line with the needs of national defence and NATO readiness requirements.

155) **The Basic Model together with the planning preconditions for ensuring national defence form the basic framework of providing for the needs of national defence. As part of the Basic Model a financially achievable AF SR model will be defined – AF SR administrative structure - peacetime establishment numbers.**

156) **The future AF SR 2030 administrative structure - peacetime establishment numbers** (circa 21 000 professional soldiers and civilian staff) quantifies not only personnel but also required capacities, capabilities and C2 structures maintained in the state of security. It will allow for a more effective and comprehensive preparation of the AF SR and ensure their operation until the moment that either war preparations or war itself are begun. It will also ensure the availability of capacities necessary for the mobilisation of the AF SR for war.

157) The future AF SR 2030 administrative structure – organigram:



158) In order to carry out these tasks the AF SR will maintain forces, headquarters and units in designated readiness levels. They will also have at



their disposal capabilities in line with NATO standards and will be able to take part in a wide spectrum of current and future conflicts.

**159) Mobilised AF SR reserves are the difference between the Basic Model and the AF SR administrative structure - peacetime establishment numbers.**

**160)** The AF SR will comprise the following basic administrative services and elements: Land Forces, Air Force, Special Operations Forces and Directly Subordinated Units and Facilities (DSUF) of the AF SR General Staff.

- The principal tasks of the **Land Forces**, which are the determining factor for the size and effectiveness of the AF SR, will be to ensure the defence of the Slovak Republic against military threats and to carry out tasks in non-military emergencies on the territory of the Slovak Republic. The Land Forces will have at their disposal capacities and capabilities to plan and direct ground operations, as well as to form the core of a joint force for joint operations on the territory of the Slovak Republic. They will include combat elements (infantry equipped with multirole tactical vehicles and armoured fighting vehicles, tanks), combat support elements (fire support, air defence, ISTAR and electronic warfare, engineer, Civil-Military Co-operation - CIMIC, Psychological Operations - PSYOPS and CBRN elements), combat service support elements (logistic and medical service support elements, materiel, personnel service and administration elements) and command support elements (staffs, communication, intelligence and information systems).
- The principal tasks of the **Air Force** will be the defence and protection of the airspace of the Slovak Republic as part of NATINAMDS, tactical air support of Land Forces operations and air transport. To this end the Air Force will have at its disposal interoperable C2 capabilities, a tactical air force unit, a helicopter unit, a tactical air transport unit, and capabilities of radar and radio-electronic reconnaissance, as well as air defence.
- The principal tasks of **SOF** will be to conduct missions of special reconnaissance, direct action and military assistance to security forces of foreign partners. SOF will be able to operate independently or in support of joint special operations, including counter-terrorist operations.

**161)** Support for the AF SR General Staff, forces, units and facilities of the AF SR will be provided by:

- **a command support unit of the AF SR General Staff,**
- **the stationary communication and information systems** in operating and developing the network of communication and information systems within the scope of the MoD, along with their protection and defence against cyber-attacks,
- **the military medical service** providing health care, as well as medical support to training, deployed missions and operations abroad. The *Military Medical Support Development Concept* will

- be updated with an aim to harmonise military health care development with AF SR requirements and NATO standards,
- **AF SR offices and facilities** in the area of AF SR centralised personnel management, linguistic preparedness of AF SR personnel, providing for AF SR personnel on NATO and EU military staffs, and also provide for strategic-level AF SR logistic support.

162) In keeping with NATO measures reacting to changes in the security environment, the establishment of the Slovak NFIU will continue and it will become fully operational in 2017.

163) The AF SR will be able to integrate AF SR reserves in the event of both a general and a partial mobilisation, protect and defend Facilities of Special Importance and Other Important Facilities, while providing support to allied forces on the territory of the Slovak Republic.

## 5.2 Key Capability Areas to Improve

164) The AF SR will develop a spectrum of military capabilities necessary for carrying out their tasks. The transformation of tactical units will be based on a comprehensive approach to military capability development and the interconnectedness of the following areas – **doctrines; administrative structure; equipment and other materiel, including communication and information systems; training; preparation of leaders and personnel; infrastructure and interoperability** – with an aim to achieve their greater effectiveness and deployability.

165) **Doctrines.** The complex of military doctrines will be updated and amended. By the end of 2016 the *AF SR Doctrine (C)* will be completed with the aim of implementing the know-how and the lessons learned on missions and operations led by NATO and the EU, as well as during unit training, into the doctrinal framework of the AF SR. The amendment of the entire military doctrinal architecture will be gradually continued.

166) **Administrative structure.** Changes of the administrative structure of AF SR tactical units will be gradually carried out, depending upon the replacement of major military equipment. Other changes will depend on current capability development requirements, as well as allocated resources. The end-state structure will also include newly formed units or units with capabilities answering new security challenges.

167) **Equipment and other materiel, including communication and information systems.** An increase in combat capabilities resulting from the (re)arming of tactical units will be the primary measurable indicator of

the success of transformation and the overall success of AF SR capability development. The basic condition of achieving required capabilities by the end of 2030 is either a replacement of major military equipment by a purposeful rearmament of tactical units or a militarily justified and economically effective modernisation of major military equipment.

**168) Stockpiles.** The system of organising and maintaining stockpiles of materiel, as well as the delivery system of goods and services, not only for AF SR support but also for the purposes of HNS, will be re-evaluated. Emphasis will be placed on a continued stockpiling of essential supplies necessary for AF SR mobilisation. Further efforts to achieve a balanced condition of materiel supplies with an aim to improve the effectiveness of their stockpiling will be continued. Logistic AF SR capabilities will be utilised to the outmost in order to sustain the AF SR in operations and rebuild their war-fighting ability by utilising repair services and distribution capacities. The AF SR transportation and supply system will be overhauled.

**169) Training.** The intensity of AF SR training will be enhanced and their participation in exercises focused on the defence of the Slovak Republic will be provided for. The approach to training and exercises will be based on two main, organically interconnected pillars – AF SR training on the territory of the Slovak Republic and AF SR training with foreign partners on the territory of the Slovak Republic or abroad, while emphasising cooperation with the armed forces of NATO and EU member states. Training and exercises will be planned and carried out in order to achieve and maintain assigned levels of readiness of AF SR formations, staffs and units with an emphasis on a mechanised brigade. Training of commanders and staffs will be focused on the ability to plan high intensity joint operations in defence of the Slovak Republic or the collective defence of an Ally within a complex operational environment including hybrid, cybernetic and terrorist threats. AF SR readiness to perform tasks alongside the Police Force, the Fire Department, the Rescue Service and other elements of the Integrated Rescue System will be enhanced by a joint preparation of specialists, intensified joint training and exercises. Improvements to joint preparations to perform tasks as part of the Integrated Rescue System in cases of non-military threats and in the area of counter-terrorism will be continued during joint exercises with other elements of this system and in joint exercises with the Police Force and other armed corps.

**170) Preparation of leaders.** Preparation of leaders will be applied in all forms of education and training through which a professional soldier receives his or her qualification and fulfils requirements of military service with an aim to develop his or her abilities to perform operational tasks (and other duties) and effectively lead subordinates by a mixture of personal example, motivation and insistence on results.

**171) Personnel.** The number of professional soldiers will gradually be increased to ensure that the overall manning of AF SR units is improved. Sufficient personnel numbers will be maintained in the state of security in

**The intensity of AF SR training will be enhanced**



**The number of professional soldiers will gradually be increased to ensure that the overall manning of AF SR units is improved**

order to perform the entire spectrum of AF SR tasks, including mobilisation. In the area of improving military personnel, its overall expert military preparation and education will be provided in unison with improving their moral qualities, patriotism, as well as the resolve and preparedness of professional soldiers to perform national defence tasks. Comprehensive efforts will be continued to retain key and highly qualified military personnel, which will require measures enhancing the attractiveness of a military career by amending national legislation and internal regulations, as well as maintaining the specialised social welfare system of professional soldiers. These changes will create competitive conditions on the labour market, particularly for higher commanders and managers, and also highly qualified personnel in specific military vocations such as: military medical service, aviation and air defence, communication and information systems.

**172) Infrastructure.** Changes in AF SR peace-time infrastructure, including the stationing of HQs and units, will be carried out especially in connection with maintaining key infrastructure essential for carrying out tasks in war-time. Peace-time infrastructure development projects will be aimed at enhancing the quality of living and working conditions of soldiers, and also at enhancing the quality and effectiveness of unit training at their base of operations and military training areas. It is necessary to include the gradual reconstruction of buildings in disrepair that are located in AF SR barracks among priorities.

**173) Interoperability.** Interoperability with allied forces must be procedural, technical and operational. To enhance capability interoperability, including carrying out tasks in operations jointly and eliminating AF SR capability shortfalls, multilateral (NATO, EU, Visegrad Group) and bilateral cooperation initiatives and projects will be utilised. Bilateral cooperation will be based on a pragmatic approach to states, the relations with which have a long-term military and economic potential. The enhancement of AF SR interoperability with allied forces will be advanced by cooperation in the area of training and education, including the utilisation of special educational and training facilities within the scope of the MoD.

**174) AF SR mobilisation.** The ability of the AF SR to integrate, equip and train reservists will be enhanced.

**175) Internal AF SR processes.** Internal processes of the AF SR will be simplified and made more effective. The development of the planning and development of force structures and capabilities framework, as part of the defence planning of the Slovak Republic, will be continued. Procedures regarding the AF SR taking part in operations and missions abroad and carrying out tasks during non-military emergencies on the territory of the Slovak Republic, will be optimised with the aim of improving the reaction to urgent operational demands. Initiatives to improve the quality and effectiveness of HQ staff work will be implemented.

176) Overall progress of AF SR capability development will be measured by the achieved set of capabilities. The transformation of an HQ or a unit will be completed by issuing a certificate of achieved operational readiness according to measurable indicators of NATO certification standards.

## 5.3 The Capability Development Strategy

177) The AF SR capability development strategy is based on a comprehensive transformation of tactical formations and units in line with the defence of the Slovak Republic needs and its international obligations. This strategy will be carried out with the purposeful modernisation or replacement of equipment and other materiel, including communication and information systems. Its aim is to enhance the level of AF SR capacities and combat capabilities, as well as their interoperability with allied forces.

178) Well-armed and well trained armed forces, with at least four brigades at their disposal in the state of security will be the capability development end-state. These brigades will have efficient C2 systems, an enhanced qualitative level of capabilities and of interoperability, and will be able to operate separately or as part of NATO and EU formations.

179) The AF SR capability development strategy takes into account the current NATO defence planning cycle, particularly its minimum capability requirements and the preparation of the 2017 NATO Capability Targets for Slovakia. These targets confirm the transfer of mechanised capabilities to a “heavy” category with great demands on an enhanced combat potential of units and the protection of platforms.

The transfer of mechanised capabilities to the “heavy” category

180) The AF SR capability development strategy will be implemented so as not to hamper ongoing operational tasks (the protection and defence of Slovak airspace, participation in missions and operations abroad and the performing of tasks as part of NATO and EU rapid reaction forces). AF SR capacities and capabilities employable in non-military emergencies on the territory of the Slovak Republic will be maintained. AF SR capability development will be carried out in two phases.

181) In phase I (between 2016 and 2020), the full spectrum of current capabilities with a gradual improvement of the AF SR combat potential will be maintained. The full operational capability of a mechanised brigade, enhanced capabilities of an ISTAR battalion including tactical electronic warfare capacities, along with enhanced combat support and combat service support capacities for a mechanised brigade (including a mechanised battalion group) in line with NATO Capability Targets for Slovakia, will constitute the end-state. Also, the counter-terrorist capabilities of SOF will be

A gradual improvement of the AF SR combat potential

enhanced. Moreover, C2 systems, AF SR mobilisation capabilities, including the ability to achieve necessary capabilities and AF SR logistic capacities, will be enhanced. In order to ensure the required AF SR capabilities, necessary modernisation projects will be carried out in line with set priorities.

#### 182) In phase I, armament priorities

##### ►► of the Land Forces will be:

- the development of mechanised capabilities:
  - begin arming one mechanised battalion with an 8x8 armoured fighting vehicle platform,
  - continue with the replacement/modernisation of Infantry Fighting Vehicles of mechanised units,
- the development of motorised and reconnaissance capabilities:
  - begin arming an ISTAR battalion with a 4x4 multirole tactical vehicle platform,
  - begin arming a motorised battalion with 4x4 armoured fighting vehicle and 4x4 multirole tactical vehicle platforms,
- the development of other capabilities:
  - replace and modernise other major military equipment and materiel, and also the materiel of combat support units of the Land Forces for a mechanised brigade and a mechanised battalion group, including 3<sup>rd</sup> generation anti-tank guided missile systems,
  - solve interoperability and compatibility of AF SR communication and information systems, including the mobile communication system (MOKYS) and provide necessary communication and information systems for AF SR command posts, primarily at the tactical and operational level in order to meet the certification criteria by a mechanised brigade,
  - continue with replacing vehicles, augmenting and replacing logistical container and handling equipment, workshop, repair and field facilities, as well as the facilities of medical services capacities with the aim of comprehensively rearming logistics battalions, a combat support battalion and a repair battalion of the combat service support brigade.

##### ►► of the Air Force will be:

- the development of transport capabilities
  - complete replacing transport aircraft,
- the development of helicopter capabilities:
  - continue replacing multirole helicopters,
- maintain the multirole tactical aircraft capability:
  - launch the replacement of tactical air-force hardware,
- the development of air defence and airfield capabilities:
  - begin the replacement of radars with new types of close, short and medium-range 3D radars; begin the replacement of airfield radars,
  - begin the replacement of Air Force radio-electronic reconnaissance components,
- development of other Air Force capabilities:
  - begin the replacement of automated air defence C2 systems,
  - replace control systems and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for the purposes of Imagery Intelligence - IMINT.



►► of SOF will be:

- to continue with the procurement of weaponry for the SOF service, which will be developed as an independent component within the AF SR,
- to enhance training capacities and tactical mobility.

**183) Decisions will be taken in the first phase on the basis of an expert military report concerning the following main armament projects:**

- **armoured fighting vehicles** – launch the procurement of 8x8 armoured fighting vehicles, 4x4 armoured fighting vehicles, 4x4 multirole tactical vehicles, all of which are a condition sine qua non for a fully-fledged mechanised battalion, an ISTAR battalion, the 23<sup>rd</sup> Motorised Battalion, CIMIC and PSYOPS units respectively,
- **battle tanks** – maintain this capability and by the end of the first phase prepare a tank unit development plan (taking into account the 2017 NATO Capability Targets for Slovakia),
- **trainer jets** – extend the lifespan of the L-39 aircraft or their replacement with new multipurpose sub-sonic jets,
- **multipurpose helicopters** – complete the replacement of medium multipurpose helicopters in line with the contractual framework in order to achieve required operational capabilities. Take steps to maintain operational capabilities of the helicopter element to carry out tasks in case of non-military emergencies on the territory of the Slovak Republic,
- **attack helicopters** – procure new attack helicopters depending on the recommendations of an analysis of needs and possibilities in the context of the security environment evolution,
- **air-defence systems** – ensure maintenance of the operational capabilities of air-defence systems, emphasising the firing component of air-defence and their possible development.

**184) Also, measures will be taken in the first phase in order to:**

- enhance intelligence and electronic warfare capabilities,
- improve the effectiveness of C2 systems and continue with measures to optimise the war-time AF SR administrative structure,
- enhance logistical capabilities for national defence tasks, including HNS,
- improve the effectiveness of logistics services covering the entire spectrum of AF SR logistical support and enhance the logistics support of the AF SR, especially in the area of nutrition and repair capabilities,
- improve the effectiveness of the centralised procurement system and transfer necessary authority in favour of other entities (AF SR units),
- enhance the operation of AF SR support and rear administration and facilities,
- maintain essential AF SR capacities and capabilities in the area of cyber-defence,
- implement allied documents for the support of AF SR staffs, formations and units with an aim of achieving and maintaining interoperability

with allied forces in line with NATO Capability Targets for Slovakia, the Headline Aims of the EU and NATINAMDS; as well as documents for the preparation and the evaluation of those AF SR units that will be declared for NATO and EU rapid reaction forces.

**The AF SR will have at their disposal a larger number of units at higher readiness**

**185) In phase II (between 2021 and 2030)** the overall AF SR war-fighting potential will increase, along with their ability to carry out tasks connected with the defence of the Slovak Republic and its international commitments. The end-state in the state of security will be a sustained, fully operational capability of a mechanised brigade (in line with NATO Capability Targets for Slovakia), enhanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capacities at the operational and tactical levels. At the same time, combat support and combat service support capacities for a mechanised brigade, including a mechanised battalion group, will be provided for. AF SR capacities to carry out missions and operations abroad will be enhanced. By the end of the second phase, the AF SR will have a larger number of units at higher readiness at their disposal. Modernisation projects in line with set priorities will be carried through in order to provide for the necessary AF SR capabilities.

**186) In phase II, armament priorities**

**►► of the Land Forces will be:**

- the development of mechanised/tank capabilities:
  - conclude the outfitting of two mechanised battalions with 8x8 armoured fighting vehicles,
  - replace/modernise hardware of tank units,
  - conclude the replacement/modernisation of Infantry Fighting Vehicles of mechanised units,
- the development of motorised and reconnaissance capabilities:
  - conclude the arming of an ISTAR battalion,
  - conclude the outfitting of a motorised battalion with 4x4 multirole tactical vehicles,
- the development of other capabilities:
  - conclude the replacement/modernisation of major military equipment, including communication and information systems of Land Forces; equipment and other materiel in CIMIC/PSYOPS, CBRN and engineer support/Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units,
  - conclude the replacement of vehicles, augmentation and replacement of container and handling equipment, workshop, repair and field logistics assets of the combat service support brigade,
  - conclude the replacement of field assets of medical service capacities.

**►► of the Air Force will be:**

- the development of tactical capabilities:
  - conclude the replacement/modernisation of multipurpose tactical aircraft,

- the development of helicopter capabilities:
    - conclude the replacement of multipurpose helicopters,
    - procure attack helicopters (depending on decisions taken in phase I, see para. 183),
  - the development of air defence and airfield capabilities:
    - modernise automated air defence C2 systems,
    - conclude the replacement of radars with new types of 3D radars,
    - replace/modernise ground-based firing assets of air defence,
  - the development of other air-force capabilities:
    - conclude the replacement of radio-electronic reconnaissance components,
    - conclude the replacement/modernisation of trainer aircraft and aircraft providing aerial photography,
    - procure a system aimed at countering rocket, artillery and mortar fire (C-RAM),
    - procure munition supplies for the air-force and air defence systems according to norms.
- of SOF will be:
- to procure equipment and other materiel necessary for the finalisation of building additional capabilities, including capabilities for the planning and combat support of special air operations,
  - to procure equipment and other materiel to develop capabilities required for counter-terrorist operations, including air mobility and, at the same time, for sustaining tactical land mobility.

## 5.4 Command and Control

187) The AF SR will develop their C2 system with a high level of interoperability with allied forces. In phase I, the personnel capacities of the General Staff administrative structures will be enhanced with the aim of enhancing and maintaining essential capabilities required to maintain the ability to plan and manage operations, as well as to command the AF SR. Emphasis will be placed on the resilience and sustainability of AF SR command and on ensuring a fluent transition towards C2 arrangements in war-time conditions. Necessary procedural and structural changes will continue in order to strengthen the unity of command and control at the particular levels of command. The capability and efficiency of AF SR C2 arrangements in preparing, coordinating and ensuring performance in relation to the collective defence of the Slovak Republic will be enhanced by the formation of the Slovak NFIU.

188) In phase II, the implementation of measures for maintaining and enhancing AF SR C2 capabilities will be continued. Decisions on the further development of C2 structures will be taken in the context of changes in the security environment, including the possibility of merging individual branch HQs into one HQ in the state of security.

The AF SR will develop their C2 system



## 5.5 Risks Involved

189) Measures to eliminate ongoing risks will be taken and implemented in the area of:

- maintaining essential AF SR capabilities already necessary in the state of security,
- the technical condition of outdated military equipment and the lagging of AF SR technical level of major military equipment behind NATO standards,
- the resource demands on repair, maintenance and retention of outdated military equipment and other materiel, including communication and information systems,
- the depletion of munition, fuel and other materiel supplies intended for crisis situations, as well as overall AF SR supply shortfalls,
- the intensity and quality of AF SR unit training.

190) Battle-worthy units capable of carrying out their mission without major limitations will be considered the basic output of the AF SR transformation process. Its conclusion, as well as a possible increase in AF SR tasks, require the allocation of adequate resources.





*Matej Tóth from the Military Sports Centre Dukla Banská Bystrica after winning a gold medal at the Summer Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro.*





*Every soldier must be proficient in hand-to-hand combat.*



*Terrain orientation without modern technology.*



*The AF SR Academy of Milan Rastislav Štefánik in Liptovský Mikuláš trains officers for the AF SR.*





# Human Resources

## Development in the scope of the MoD

*The aim of human resources development in the scope of the MoD is to increase the knowledge, abilities and skills of military and civilian personnel, improve their workplace and social conditions, retain highly qualified professional soldiers, develop the military university-level education, career and vocational training system, as well as to improve the efficiency of the AF SR augmentation system.*

### 6.1 Personnel Management

191) Personnel management at the MoD will provide an increase in the quality of the internal environment in the area of manpower management and social policy, which will enable a **comprehensive, optimal and efficient development of human resources** necessary for national defence development, including AF SR transformation.

192) An increase in the complexity of national defence tasks also **increases the demands on the educational, professional and moral qualities of military and civilian personnel**. All resources available will be utilised in order to provide for these requirements, and when needed, changes in national legislation and internal regulations will be proposed.

### 6.2 Improving and Replenishing Military Personnel

*Improving military personnel*

193) The basic condition of improving and retaining highly qualified professional soldiers will be the purposeful and effective utilisation of investment put into professional soldiers and into their work environment.

Know-how gained from the **experience of applying national legislation and internal regulations concerning the military service** of professional soldiers **will be regularly analysed**. This will form the basis of the **proposal of measures aimed at stabilisation and motivation factors** related to the performance of military service by professional soldiers, which will make it more attractive and more competitive on the labour market.

194) The system of rewarding professional soldiers will have a significant impact on providing stability and motivation for professional soldiers, their systematic rotation and recruitment. **This system will be reviewed and adjusted** on the basis of experience gained and the development of the national minimum and average wage, taking into consideration performed functions and activities.

The system of rewarding professional soldiers will be reviewed and adjusted

195) A **quality of life of the professional soldier model**, will be added to the tools of personnel management. This model will define standards, comparable with those of other NATO member states, which are desirable especially in the areas of: the conditions under which professional soldiers execute military service, social policy, family life and housing.

196) **The implementation of the support programs** system will increase the level of care provided to professional soldiers. These programs will take into account the needs of professional soldiers and their families.

197) Professional soldiers will be provided with **first-class, internationally comparable education in the area of national defence**, military university-level education in all three degree-levels, as well as the military preparation and training of future officers. Continuous education will be provided to professional soldiers over the course of their military career.

198) During the **course of the military preparation** of professional soldiers and their education, emphasis will be placed on improving the level of expertise, moral qualities, character and the nurturing of patriotism in keeping with national and military traditions.

Emphasis will be placed on improving the level of expertise, moral qualities and character of professional soldiers

199) As part of the development of military education:

- **an institutional accreditation** of the AF SR Academy will be carried out through NATO Allied Command Transformation **for the quality management** of provided education and training in accordance with NATO standards,
- **student profiles of the Academy graduates will be flexibly updated** so that they correspond with the newest findings of military science and most recent AF SR demands,
- **the level of expertise of the Academy graduates** in specific military fields **will be enhanced** by flexibly interlacing, as part of study programs, theoretical training at the Academy with traineeships in AF SR units and facilities, and with practical training at AF SR training facilities,
- part of the system of education and preparation of professional soldiers will also be **the education and preparation in Slovak civilian**



- universities, and for specific military fields, in **military educational institutions abroad**,
- **the condition of career and vocational training will be analysed and measures will be taken to optimise them** with the aim of creating conditions for effective career planning and professional training, specified in the career structure by a military occupational field supervisor, tying in to staffing objectives in the career of professional soldiers,
- an appropriate system of professional training in fields that are found wanting will be created in order to ensure sufficient military personnel professionally prepared at the secondary school level.

200) Major factors influencing the career of professional soldiers and constituting a relevant part of their professional profile, will be the graduation from career and professional courses abroad, experiences gained on missions and operations abroad and in the NATO and EU command structures.

201) Internal regulations concerning the linguistic education at the MoD are being updated with the aim of taking into account the rising requirements on the level of linguistic preparedness of professional soldiers. **The number of hours cadets are taught the English language at the Academy will be increased, along with an increase of English lessons at the career courses** (depending on the level of these courses). This will support the increase of linguistic proficiency of professional soldiers over the course of their career.

202) The specialised social welfare system of professional soldiers interconnected with the rules of professional military service will be one of the deciding factors of retaining high-quality personnel in the AF SR, and for this reason, **the level of entitlements from the Social Welfare and Retirement System will be retained**. For the purposes of improving the quality of this social welfare system it will be monitored and evaluated further.

203) In the case of replacing military personnel, notice will be taken of the character of the activities carried out in connection to the military occupational field and its specialisation. Replacements will be continuously monitored, while the age structure of professional soldiers in specific ranks will be analysed, and **short and long-term measures will be proposed according to AF SR requirements in relation to the age structure** of AF SR professional soldiers.

204) Appropriate conditions will be created for the transition of professional soldiers to a civilian environment and their ability to be assertive on the labour market after concluding their military service.

#### *Recruitment*

205) Forms and methods of recruitment will be **adapted to modern conditions** with an emphasis on the electronic dimension. Their content will

focus on target groups of the general public, especially from the point of view of their received education, for the replenishment of corresponding ranks and military occupational fields according to AF SR needs. **A more effective strategy of promoting the AF SR and a timely, targeted marketing strategy** will be a major factor of the recruitment process.

206) In order to achieve and ensure a higher quality of the recruitment process, admission criteria placed on prospective candidates and the qualitative output parameters that successful candidates must meet will be continually assessed.

## 6.3 Generating and Preparing Reserves

207) **Training of the active reserves, which are given top priority**, will be provided for by the AF SR in respect to organisation, personnel, materiel and training capacities. The expert part of their training will be carried out in the unit for which they are being prepared. The quality of training and its benefits for the augmentation of appropriate units, conditions set up for the training of soldiers of the active reserves in line with national legislation and its perception by the public will be assessed.

The training of active reserves will be given top priority

208) AF SR reserves will also be **formed by means of voluntary military training**. This kind of training will be periodically and broadly assessed, including its contribution to the formation of reserve forces.

209) Based on the evaluation of the effectiveness of active reserve training and the contribution of voluntary military training to the formation of AF SR reserve forces, either **measures for their development or an additional instrument for the formation of AF SR reserves and the enhancement of their readiness** will be prepared.

## 6.4 Education and Care for Civilian Personnel

210) The expertise of civilian personnel will be **increased by relevant training**, including specific areas concerning national security and defence, carried out in departmental and non-departmental training facilities and institutions.

211) Attention will be given to **improving working conditions** of civilian personnel at the MoD. Social policy will be part of these conditions in order to acquire, retain and motivate civilian personnel.





*The 5<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Regiment is an elite unit.*



*It is important to test out real situations during exercises.*







*The UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters have a wide variety of uses.*



*The L-410 of the AF SR Air Force may also serve in resolving non-military emergencies.*



# Armament

*The aim of armament is to ensure the qualitative and quantitative availability of military equipment and other materiel, including communication and information systems in order to ensure the completion of AF SR tasks, especially those concerning national defence.*

## 7.1 Key Requirements

**Armament will be systemically tied to enhancing AF SR capabilities**

212) National defence tasks in the changed security environment will be decisive for the focus of **armament**, which will be **systemically tied to enhancing AF SR capabilities and implemented purposefully** in order to augment, modernise or replace military equipment and other materiel, including communication and information systems of an entire AF SR unit.

213) Armament will be founded on its resource base in defence planning, emphasising the **entire life cycle** of defence systems, equipment and related services provided in Slovakia and other NATO and EU member states.

214) Replacement or modernisation of military equipment and other materiel, including communication and information systems will be carried out to ensure **long-term sustainability, while strategic projects will be provided for and supported by the Government by approving and financing them individually**. Armament projects monitored by and decided on by the Government will be financed either within the limits of the MoD budget, or by specially allocated additional funds beyond the limits of the MoD budget chapter.

215) Special Governmental approval and financing of projects concerning major military equipment is a prerequisite of concluding such projects in a shorter time, which will support a targeted modernisation or replacement of the military hardware of an entire AF SR unit and a timelier acquisition of necessary capabilities.

216) **Possibilities of modernising** military equipment and other materiel, including communication and information systems already in use **will be considered** in the preparatory phase of projects from the point of view of military expertise, economic effectiveness and the potential of their further use. An economically advantageous **unification** military hardware, justified by military experts, will be carried out. Along with armament projects, a stock of materiel will be amassed, with an emphasis on spare parts and ammunition.

217) The modernisation or replacement of major military equipment will allow for a **deeper involvement of the Slovak defence industry**, which will improve the security and availability of supplies in war-time, the stability and long-term sustainability of the life cycles of military hardware, support economic growth of the Slovak Republic and domestic employment. New products of the home defence industry utilised by the AF SR has better prospects on foreign markets with synergetic returns for the Slovak economy. In cases of projects co-sponsored by foreign partners, **support will be given to the utilisation of home defence industry capabilities** in the realisation phase of a project, with the possibility of extending it to the maintenance and repair phase a of product. The Slovak defence industry will be involved in research and development to ensure national defence.

**A deeper involvement of the Slovak defence industry**

218) In order to improve cooperation and communication between the MoD and the Slovak defence industry, the *MoD - Security and Defence Industry Association of the Slovak Republic Cooperation Agreement* will be updated. With the involvement of this association and other relevant state authorities, the creation of a strategic framework for the development of the Slovak defence industry will be initiated.

219) **Possibilities and economic advantages of international cooperation** in the area of key armament projects will be systematically identified, especially with Visegrad Group countries and other NATO and EU member states. This cooperation will be developed primarily in relation to the replacement of obsolete soviet hardware and joint acquisitions of financially challenging technologies. **Services of NATO agencies and the European Defence Agency will be utilised in the area of armament.**

220) Use of off-the-shelf and dual-use technologies will also support the effectiveness of resource utilisation in the area of armament.

## 7.2 Priorities

221) Priorities in line with the AF SR capability development strategy will be the following:

- **projects with concluded realisation agreements with the provider:**

- C-27J transport aircraft,
- UH-60M multipurpose helicopters,
- tracked combat vehicle modernisation (Infantry Fighting Vehicles),
- **projects increasing the qualitative parameters of main combat equipment of the Land Forces and eliminating critical capability shortfalls of a mechanised brigade:**
  - special military, equipment and other materiel for ISTAR,
  - completion of the communication system (MOKYS),
  - 4x4 armoured fighting vehicles and 4x4 multipurpose tactical vehicles,
  - 8x8 armoured fighting vehicles,
  - radars for an air-defence task force (close and short-range 3D radars),
  - artillery equipment and the integrated artillery system (DELOSYS),
  - anti-tank guided missiles and ammunition,
- **projects increasing the qualitative parameters of the main combat equipment of the Air Force and projects reducing the technological dependence on the Russian Federation:**
  - multipurpose tactical aircraft replacing the MiG-29 fighters,
  - replacement and augmentation of air-defence radar equipment (medium-range 3D radars),
  - new automated C2 systems and appropriate information transfer systems,
  - ground based air defence systems (replacement/modernisation of S-300 PMU and 2K12 KUB anti-aircraft missile systems),
  - air-to-air guided missiles and precision guided munitions for the Air Force,
- **projects ensuring an essential level of communication and information systems, including classified information transfer systems, as well as the defence and protection of networks in cyberspace,**
- **projects modernising/replacing further Land Forces equipment and materiel:**
  - special ammunition for main combat equipment of Land Forces and SOF (tying in with the modernisation/replacement of equipment), replacement and augmentation of medium and heavy transport all-terrain vehicles and other transport, special and field equipment,
  - augmentation, modernisation or replacement of engineer support equipment, EOD, CBRN, CIMIC and PSYOPS equipment,
  - introduction of tactical UAVs,
  - logistic transport, handling, workshop and repair equipment,
  - resolution of the problem concerning the substitution/replacement of tanks,
  - systems countering rockets, artillery and mortar fire (C-RAM),
- **projects modernising/replacing other Air Force equipment and materiel:**



- airfield radars,
- trainer jets,
- multipurpose helicopters in different variants,
- weapon modules and other modules for the UH-60M multipurpose helicopters.

## 7.3 Investment Phases

222) Armament projects in line with priorities and planning assumptions for ensuring national defence will be implemented in two phases.

223) In phase I (between 2016 and 2020), efforts will be primarily aimed at these key projects:

- **transport aircraft** (*according to the concluded contract*),
- **multipurpose helicopters** (*according to the concluded contract*),
- **modernisation of combat tracked vehicles** (Infantry Fighting Vehicles) (*according to the concluded contract*),
- **special military equipment and other materiel for SOF and the ISTAR battalion**,
- **medium-range 3D radar** (*replacement*),
- **4x4 multipurpose tactical vehicles and 4x4 armoured fighting vehicles**, primarily for a motorised battalion and the ISTAR battalion (*procurement and introduction of new types, continue in phase II*),
- **8x8 armoured fighting vehicles** for two mechanised battalions (*procurement and introduction of new types, continue in phase II*),
- **multipurpose tactical aircraft** (*launch procurement – lease/procurement and decision on expanding this capability to provide combat support to ground forces*),
- **medium and heavyweight transport all-terrain vehicles and other transport, special and field equipment for parts of the logistics battalions, a part of the combat service support battalion and a part of the repair battalion** (*replacement and augmentation according to concluded contract, continue in phase II*),
- **modernisation and integration of artillery support components** (DELOSYS),
- **air defence automated C2 systems and information transfer equipment** (*continue in phase II*),
- **close and short-range 3D radars** (*continue in phase II*),
- **weapon and other modules for some multipurpose helicopters** (*launch procurement, continue in phase II*),
- **3<sup>rd</sup> generation anti-tank guided missiles** (*procurement, continue in phase II*),
- **medical equipment/small all-terrain vehicles/engineer equipment/EOD**,

- airfield radars (*launch replacement, continue in phase II*),
- air-to-air guided missiles and precision guided munitions (*procurement, continue in phase II*),
- radio-electronic reconnaissance components (*launch replacement, continue in phase II*),
- control systems and UAV components for the purposes of imagery intelligence (*replacement*),
- ground based air defence systems (*replacement/modernisation of the S-300 PMU and 2K12 KUB anti-aircraft systems*),
- trainer jets (*replacement/extend technical life span*),
- tanks (*replacement/modernisation*).

Projects primarily for the purposes of the certification of a mechanised brigade will be continued

224) In phase I, replacement and augmentation of communication and information systems projects will be continued, including mobile equipment, C2 systems with enhanced information security, replacement of other support equipment and materiel, primarily for the purposes of the certification of a mechanised brigade. Decisions will be made about the possibility of modernising other combat tracked vehicles (Infantry Fighting Vehicles). If the modernisation of these vehicles will be discontinued, decisions will be made about the equipment of the remaining units.

225) In the first phase, financially demanding strategic armament projects will be submitted to the Government for a decision on the method of procurement and financing.

226) In phase II (between 2021 and 2030), primarily projects launched in phase I will be concluded and individual projects will be carried out as decided by the Government:

- 4x4 multirole tactical vehicles and 4x4 armoured fighting vehicles for a motorised battalion, an ISTAR battalion and for other units (*conclude in line with decision in phase I*),
- 8x8 armoured fighting vehicles for a second mechanised battalion (*conclude in line with decision in phase I*),
- the modernisation or replacement of combat tracked vehicles (Infantry Fighting Vehicles) (*in line with decision in phase I*),
- multipurpose tactical aircraft (*broadening of this capability in line with decision in phase I*),
- combat command, automated fire-control and reconnaissance means, artillery and artillery fire systems (*conclusion of modernisation/replacement*),
- air defence automated C2 systems and information transfer equipment (*conclusion of projects*),
- airfield radars (*conclusion of replacement*),
- close and short-range 3D radars (*conclusion of replacement*),
- weapon and other modules for some multipurpose helicopters (*conclusion of procurement*),
- trainer jets (*in line with decision in phase I*),
- multipurpose helicopters (*in line with decision in phase I*),

- medium and heavyweight transport all-terrain vehicles and other transport, special and field equipment for parts of the logistics battalions, a part of the combat service support battalion and a part of the repair battalion (*continue with replacement and augmentation*),
- tactical UAVs (*procurement*),
- ground based air-defence systems (*in line with decision in phase I*),
- systems aimed at countering rocket, artillery and mortar fire (C-RAM) (*formation/introduction*),
- special munitions for main combat hardware of Land Forces, the Air Force and SOF (*in line with modernisation/replacement of equipment*),
- radio-electronic reconnaissance components (*conclusion of replacement*),
- tanks (*in line with decision in phase I*),
- attack helicopters (*depending on the decision in phase I*).

227) In phase II, other ISTAR equipment and also the military equipment and other materiel for SOF will be continuously augmented; obsolete engineer, EOD, CBRN, medical and other support equipment and materiel will be augmented and replaced. Projects to ensure further **qualitative improvement in the area of communication and information systems** will be carried out, including their information security, modernisation or replacement of mobile components and means for defence and protection against cyber-attacks.

228) Equipment will be modernised, replaced by new equipment and augmented in the time-frame of the above mentioned phases, while the financial backing in line with a long-term repayment plan may exceed the duration of a phase. **Decisions about the time plan of individual projects, excluding already concluded contracts and those projects that are underway, will be based on defined priorities or on current national defence needs, in the context of the changing security environment.**

229) The consolidation of necessary stocks for AF SR combat units will get under way, together with the carrying out of armament projects.





*A soldier must be fit and training is an indelible part of his life.*



*Target practice with the vz. 58 assault rifle.*







*Moving materiel  
in containers.*



*Joint exercises with allied  
forces increase our readiness  
to react to threats.*



*Fire exercises from  
a mobile anti-aircraft  
rocket system.*



*Engineer units  
bridging a river.*

# Infrastructure Development in the scope of the MoD

*The aim of developing infrastructure managed by the MoD is its construction and maintenance in line with national defence needs. Emphasis is to be placed on a gradual modernisation of the infrastructure of AF SR formations and facilities, and also on infrastructure for their training while effectively dispensing with finances, alongside common funding through NSIP.*

## 8.1 Basic State Property Management and Infrastructure Development Requirements

**The stabilisation  
of the network  
of military installations  
and the development  
of infrastructure**

230) Basic requirements placed on the management and accounting of movable and immovable property managed by the MoD and on infrastructure development will be:

- the stabilisation of the network of military installations, on the basis of a revaluation of immovable asset requirements of assets managed by the MoD (including of those assets declared redundant), so that necessary capacities are maintained for professional soldiers and active reservists until such time as the state is threatened by war or for the purposes of HNS,
- adjust the extent of state movable and immovable assets managed by the MoD to national defence needs,
- legal settlement of property-rights of installations, especially in the vicinity of airfields,
- ensure transparency, economic efficiency and effective disposal of redundant and expendable state property managed by the MoD,
- establishment of a unified database concerning infrastructure managed by the MoD, based on MoD Integrated Information System modules,
- the establishment of modern and economically efficient infrastructure, including the resolution of the problems concerning the condition of buildings which do not meet technical norms and which have been in disrepair for many years,



- the development of infrastructure in connection with military hardware and stock development based on AF SR requirements,
- make use of common funding through NSIP in the case of infrastructure projects related to HNS, as well as the improvement of the preparation and implementation of these projects.

## 8.2 Infrastructure Development Priorities

231) Development of infrastructure will be carried out in these priority areas:

- the construction of basic **airfield infrastructure**, with emphasis placed on the operation of new aviation equipment and the NATO Air Command and Control System,
- the construction and **modernisation of infrastructure for the purposes of HNS** in line with appropriate planning documents,
- **the improvement of the energy efficiency** of utilised buildings by modernising their heating systems and insulation,
- ensure the protection of selected premises and facilities, as well as the conditions for handling classified information (**facility security**),
- the construction of a high quality **education and training base** in military training areas and barrack training grounds with an emphasis placed on new methods of training and the interconnection of simulation technology centres with an emphasis on unit training in such conditions, which are close to the reality of the current battlefield. The construction of the Training Centre - Lešť as a national centre for training domestic and foreign armed and rescue corps will continue, which will include a tactical field for mechanised units training,
- enhance **the quality of life of personnel** by modernising and repairing administrative, housing, training, storage and social areas, with an aim to improve their working conditions,
- contribution to the protection of the **natural environment** by repairing buildings and modernising technical facilities, especially workshops for vehicles, washing facilities for equipment, warehouses, fuel dispensers, water resource management facilities and coal fuelled heating plants.

## 8.3 Investment Phases

232) In phase I (between 2016 and 2020), infrastructure development will be focused on airfield infrastructure (repair of buildings and running surfaces of the Kuchyňa, Sliach and Prešov airfields) taking also into account

its utilisation for HNS, and also on improving the energy efficiency of buildings and the modernisation of heating units (particularly solid fuel heating plants), the facility security of selected buildings (the modernisation and installation of security systems), further development of the Training Centre - Lešt (the repair and modernisation of the Combined Arms Tactical Shooting Range) and the repair of facilities improving the quality of life of personnel.

233) In phase II (between 2021 and 2030), the implementation of infrastructure development projects launched in the first phase will be continued and other projects will be implemented in priority areas, while emphasis will be placed on the education and training base of training facilities.







*Medical support is also important for national defence.*



*The doors of the AF SR are always open to technically minded and educated people.*



*Transporting military units by rail provides them with operational mobility.*



*An Infantry Fighting Vehicle during a field exercise.*



*Zuzana - a Self-propelled Gun Howitzer.*

# The National Defence Support System

*The aim of national defence support system development is to ensure the preparation, maintenance and development of defence infrastructure and to provide services, activities and the supply of goods to national defence.*

## 9.1 The Basis of an Effective National Defence Support System

The decisive precondition of an effective National Defence Support System will be a coordinated approach

234) The National Defence Support System will be developed as **part of the system of national defence by means of defence planning**. The decisive precondition of an effective support system of national defence will be a **coordinated approach** towards ensuring it by means of harmonising plans for the purposes of national defence and crisis plans for economic mobilisation of appropriate ministries, other central state administrative bodies and state administrative bodies with a national scope of authority and entities subject to economic mobilisation.

235) Defence infrastructure will be prepared, maintained and developed in line with the long-term national defence support development plan, while services and activities will be provided to AF SR according to MoD requirements and plans of appropriate entities subject to economic mobilisation for the purposes of national defence and HNS.

236) **The MoD** as a central state administrative body for national defence management will also actively fulfil its **coordination function** in the area of the National Defence Support System, especially by means of long and mid-term plans, so that this support system can provide the AF SR with defence capacities and capabilities they normally lack, and also that additional defence capacities can be generated. This should be based on an analysis of both the Support System and HNS.

237) Part of the National Defence Support System will also be a set of economic, organisational activities and measures as elements of economic mobilisation, which will ensure preparedness of the state for defence and



the resolution of crisis situations, with an emphasis on supporting AF SR activities concerned with national defence.

## 9.2 Defence Infrastructure

238) The preparation, maintenance and development of defence infrastructure will be provided for by the MoD on the basis of AF SR requirements (including HNS requirements) in cooperation with other ministries, other central state administrative bodies and state administrative bodies with a national scope of authority, while it keeps central records and guides recordkeeping in the said ministries, state authorities and in the AF SR.

**The preparation, maintenance and development of defence infrastructure will be provided for on the basis of AF SR requirements**

239) In maintaining and developing defence infrastructure, emphasis will be placed on the following areas:

- transport (maintaining required parameters of specified transport networks),
- electronic communication networks, communication and information systems including their protection, and also cyber-defence and cyber-protection infrastructure,
- energy and gas distribution networks (stockpiling and transport of gas and petroleum, production and distribution of electricity and petroleum products),
- central national defence management and AF SR command posts, back-up posts for constitutional bodies,
- state material reserves infrastructure,
- water dispensation points, water sources and water industry facilities for national defence needs,
- defence industry infrastructure.

240) Selection and introduction of defence infrastructure elements to the category of Facilities of Special Importance or the category of Other Important Facilities will be reevaluated. The manner of protection and defence of these facilities will be specified along with the criteria for the assignment of Other Important Facilities in relation to the specification of Critical Infrastructure and European Critical Infrastructure elements.

## 9.3 Services, Activities and Goods

241) Services and activities (for example medical and transport services, construction) and the supply of goods are provided to the AF SR and other executive components of the system of national defence within the scope of economic mobilisation.

An effective provision of required services and activities, production capacities, state material reserves and the supply of goods for the AF SR

- 242) In the area of preparation, maintenance and development of services and activities, efforts will be focused on the following:
- updating of requirements for the maintenance and the development of services and activities for the AF SR, further elements of the system of national defence and for the purposes of HNS,
  - updating requirements for retaining production capacities in entities subject to economic mobilisation, maintenance of state material reserves for the AF SR (quantities and composition) including the supply of goods planned for replacing losses and AF SR consumption,
  - the identification of measures for an effective provision of required services and activities, production capacities, state material reserves and the supply of goods for the AF SR and additional elements of the system of national defence, so that these will be either created, maintained or provided for by means of appropriate contracts for national defence needs.

## 9.4 The Focus of State Authorities in Supporting Defence

- 243) In the area of national defence support, state authorities will aim at the following:
- **The Ministry of the Interior** on the gradual modernisation of the back-up post from which the Government may carry out its activities, with an emphasis on reaching its technical interoperability with the appropriate NATO and EU C2 authorities.
  - **The Ministry of Transport, Construction and Regional Development** on ensuring the serviceability of transportation networks, the construction and maintenance of related support gear and the maintenance of an essential number of train cars and locomotives for the support of the operational deployment and employment of the AF SR on the territory of the Slovak Republic and for the purposes of HNS, electronic communications services, ensure the serviceability of emergency communications systems, secure data storage, the undertaking of tasks in the area of frequency management and providing favourable conditions for military postal service.
  - **The Ministry of Health** on the creation of a broadened sickbed capacity to provide for national defence.
  - **The Ministry of the Economy** on the replacement of AF SR losses and consumption by ensuring production, the delivery of goods, as well as the repair of military hardware by way of entities subject to economic mobilisation.
  - **The State Material Reserves** on providing the required quantity and composition of state material reserves, including their regular maintenance and augmentation, and also on the creation of an

assortment of spare parts to enable the war-time overhaul of AF SR equipment.

- **The Ministry of the Environment** on maintaining and servicing water dispensation points, selected water sources and water industry facilities to provide for national defence.
- **The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development** on providing the required articles of food to provide for national defence.
- **The Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and the Family** on taking measures aimed at creating conditions for a stable social environment and the organisation of social welfare in crisis situations.





*Children are curious about the duties of soldiers.*



*The New Year gun salute commemorating Slovak independence is carried out annually on January 1<sup>st</sup>.*





*A public presentation of the AF SR.*



*Military equipment always sparks interest.*





# National Defence and the Public

*The aim in the area of communicating national defence and the development of public relations is to maintain and strengthen trust in the measures which are taken and prepared for national defence.*

## 10.1 The Focus of Public Communication

244) In communicating national defence, emphasis will be placed on **strengthening the perception of national defence** by the public as a **matter that involves everyone**, on **deepening patriotism and defence oriented awareness in keeping with national and military traditions**, as well as on creating conditions for **gaining the broadest possible political and public support** for long-term defence priorities, with an emphasis on the development of the Armed Forces.

**The purpose behind communication is to provide objective information for the formation of a positive relationship of the public towards national defence**

245) **Principles of active strategic communication will be applied**, the purpose behind which is to provide objective information for the formation of a positive relationship of the public towards national defence and the strengthening of public resilience in the face of misinformation and propaganda of entities on home soil and abroad, directed against the security interests of the Slovak Republic.

246) **The quality of providing information and the effort to increase the level of public understanding of tasks related to national defence will be enhanced.** The way to achieve this is by objectively communicating with the public and by an overall development of public relations.

247) **Communication with the public will primarily be aimed at informing and explaining the following aspects of Slovak defence policy:**

- preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Slovak Republic and the inviolability of its borders,
- the importance of NATO and EU membership and the meeting of international commitments of the Slovak Republic, with an emphasis



- on commitments stemming from the treaty on collective defence against attack,
- active participation of citizens on ensuring national defence, including compulsory military service in war-time and other responsibilities in relation to national defence,
- the mission of the AF SR in non-military emergencies on the territory of the Slovak Republic.

248) The public will be given the **account of threats**, mainly in relation to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Slovak Republic and the inviolability of its borders, and also **the needs of ensuring national defence** in a dynamically changing security environment, where either Slovakia or her Allies may be exposed to threats relatively quickly (not excluding the causes of threats that are far afield). As required, **plans and measures will be presented**, which are undertaken in order to prevent, eliminate or decrease the effects of threats and to maintain the security of the state. Part of communicating defence matters to the public will also be the matter of defence spending and what are the adequate resource needs of national defence.

249) As part of transparently communicating achieved results, the public will also be informed about the **problems** which exist in the process of carrying out tasks connected with national defence, while being adequately informed **about their resolution**.

## 10.2 Developing Public Relations

250) The MoD will draft its own **communication strategy** in order to carry out a meaningful and effective dialogue with key departmental and non-departmental (both domestic and foreign) target groups.

251) In relation to departmental target groups, the priorities in this area will be the fostering of national and military traditions, strengthening the sense of comradeship and common interests of professional soldiers, employees, pensioners, war veterans and their family members - for this purpose tools will be utilised to provide the said groups with relevant information and space for providing feedback.

252) In relation to **non-departmental domestic target groups**:

- **to the public** – priorities will be: to objectively inform and create conditions for bringing the issues of providing national defence closer to the public with the aim of ensuring a stable high level of confidence of the public in the AF SR and to stimulate their interest in either serving in the AF SR and their active reserves, or taking part in voluntary military training.
- **to the co-presenters of MoD's positions (the media)** – the priority will be to offer objective, timely and balanced information,

Stimulate the interest of citizens in either serving in the AF SR and their active reserves, or taking part in voluntary military training

- professionally provided to the media with the aim of gaining their support and cooperation in communicating with the public.
- **to the political representatives, state administration and self-government authorities** – the priority will be a deepening of their knowledge concerning issues of national defence with the aim of gaining their support for measures increasing the ability of the state to defend itself. This will include measures increasing the preparedness of the general population for national defence. Improving the preparation of the general population for national defence will be achieved primarily by a further development of national defence education and training in primary and secondary schools, which will require cooperation with the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sports; the improvement of these preparations will also be supported by an increased level of involvement of the AF SR by way of lectures and other activities.
  - **to the third sector, non-profit, non-governmental organisations, the academia and interest groups with a professional relationship with the AF SR** – the priority will be to actively communicate with the aim of intensifying their cooperation with the AF SR in the area of increasing the preparedness of the general population for national defence, deepening defence awareness and fostering patriotism among citizens and their pride in the AF SR, along with the fostering of national and military traditions. Cooperation with these entities and the expert community, the greatest contribution of which is to communicate relevant information about national defence to the public, in creating a platform for public discussion and in the drafting of analysis and expert defence policy proposals, will be carried out on the principle of constructiveness and a common interest to increase the support of the public for enhancing the ability of the state to defend itself. In communicating with interest groups with a professional relationship with the AF SR, participated in by appropriate MoD and AF SR entities, the possibility of utilising the deeper interest of their members in the activities which have military uses will be taken into account. This may take the form of joint activities and even active service in the AF SR or their active reserves, not excluding their taking part in voluntary military training.

253) In relation to **foreign partners**, primarily foreign media, the representatives of international organisations and diplomats, the priority will be to present Slovakia as a democratic state, respectful of international law, prepared to defend itself and to meet its obligations, with the aim of fostering an image of a reliable ally and a partner that is pro-European and pro-NATO.

# The White Paper Implementation

The *White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic* provides a politico-strategic framework for providing national defence, which will be elaborated and implemented by additional documents in line with their purpose and character. The methods of implementing the White Paper are based on a gradual drafting or updating of strategic and conceptual documents that are interconnected both in time and content. These will be translated into amendments to national legislation. Practical results of the White Paper implementation will be achieved by relevant documents pertaining to the planning of national defence. The following key documents will be drafted in line with the White Paper:

**a) in the area of strategic documents:**

- the *Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic* as a key strategic document in the area of national defence tying into the *Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic*, taking into account NATO's strategic adaptation process and key circumstances of future EU development with emphasis placed on the politico-military aspects of the *EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy*, will define the basic parameters of defence policy in the current and future security environment with an emphasis on defining requirements for improving the management and providing for national defence. It will also define the politico-military ambition of the Slovak Republic along with the requirements for AF SR capability development including requirements concerning resourcing arrangements. The Defence Strategy will provide the basis for the drafting of a *Military Strategy of the Slovak Republic* (2017);

**b) in the area of conceptual documents:**

- the *System of National Defence Development Concept* in line with the Defence Strategy will conceptually elaborate measures improving the preparedness, management and providing for national defence within the system of national defence, including the proposal of amendments to national legislation dealing with national defence (2017);

**c) in the area of planning documents:**

- the *Long-term AF SR Development Plan until 2030* will specify the content and schedule of steps to be taken in key areas of AF SR and Military Police development (2016);

**d) in the area of updating defence legislation:**

- **amendments to national legislation and internal regulations concerning national defence**, which update the legal framework of national defence in the context of ensuring national defence in line with the new strategic and conceptual framework of national defence (2018).



The *White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic* is the basis for further documents and measures listed in the White Paper Implementation Timetable of Key Measures below.















# Acronyms and Abbreviations

AF SR	Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic
C-RAM	Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar
C2	Command and Control
C4I	Command, Control, Communications, Computer and Intelligence
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CIMIC	Civil-Military Co-operation Computers & Intelligence
DELOSYS	system of command and support of the artillery
DSUF	Directly Subordinated Units and Facilities
HQ	Headquarters
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HNS	Host Nation Support
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
ISTAR	Information, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance
JSC	Joint Stock Company
MoD	Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic
MOKYS	Mobile Communication System
NATINAMDS	NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NFIU	NATO Force Integration Unit
NSIP	NATO Security Investment Programme
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
SOF	Special Operations Forces
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UN	United Nations



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